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The central question investigated in the project was
what happens after privatization  how privatization affects
the economic performance of privatized companies, and
thereby of transforming economies as a whole. The tasks
which the researchers set for themselves included a descrip-
tion of the privatization techniques used in each country, a
summary of the results and significance of privatization in
the economy as a whole, and analysis of company-level data
to examine the factors underlying changes in company 
performance. We were interested primarily in the changes
that various types of privatization bring about in corporate
governance and how these are, in turn, correlated with
changes in performance.
The contents of this report will appear, in somewhat
abbreviated form, in a book to be published in the summer
of 1999 under the title Privatization and Economic Perfor-
mance in Central and Eastern Europe - Lessons to be Learnt
from Western Europe by Edward Elgar Ltd. (Cheltenham,
UK and Brookfield, US). We present the results of the Pol-
ish research in this report in order to acquaint our readers
with research results which we see as a continuation of
previous studies on enterprise restructuring in Poland,
including those carried out by the World Bank and the
Gdañsk Institute for Market Economics. We believe that
these results represent an interesting new contribution to
the study of the relationships between enterprise restruc-
turing on the one hand and ownership transformation and
other economic factors of post-Communist transforma-
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Together with the stabilization and liberalization of the
economy, privatization was one of the underpinning princi-
ples of the reform program launched at the end of 1989.
Under the program, privatization is to be a tool for increas-
ing the efficiency of enterprises and bringing the ownership
structure of the economy into line with market economy
norms. In the first privatization program, overly optimistic
assumptions were made whereby approximately half of all
national assets would be transferred to private owners in
the course of the initial three years of the reform [1]. The
reality of privatization proved to be much more difficult.
From the beginning of the transition the Polish privatization
concept was burdened with too many different expecta-
tions and important goals competing among each other [2].
It was not immediately evident to all Polish reformers and
politicians that some of those privatization goals were part-
ly contradictory and could not be achieved simultaneously
(for instance it is impossible to gain high revenues from pri-
vatization for the state budget and to maintain a rapid speed
of ownership transformation).
On the other hand, privatization was seen as a very con-
troversial political topic by the public. Social mistrust of pri-
vatization arose from different reasons. Fears of radical
changes were linked with resentments of a historical nature
(for example fears of losing working places and of selling
out enterprises to foreigners) [3] and strengthened with
bad examples of asset stripping by the new-old owners (the
so-called nomenklatura). Last but not least, influential
groups of the population were interested in keeping the
state-owned sector unchanged and felt threatened by pri-
vatization [Macieja, 1997]. The consolidation of these
groups led to pressures on the government, in order to
obtain preferential treatment instead of fast privatization
and radical restructuring. The politicians were unable to
play against these groups, being anxious about losing large
parts of their constituency.
However, during the eight years of reforms public opin-
ion on privatization changed slowly. Experience with priva-
tization taught many people that privatization results in ben-
efits to the enterprises and employees and to the economy
as a whole. Moreover, many of the enterprises managers
learned that privatization is an unavoidable step for the
future development of their enterprises. Additionally, the
public now is much more aware of the necessity of deep
restructuring of each enterprise and of the economy as a
whole in order to compete on the domestic market and on
the future European market. This results in a more positive
attitude to foreign investors than at the beginning of
reforms.
In this chapter, the privatization of the economy is not
regarded as just the privatization of the state sector. The for-
mer notion refers to the increase of the private sector share
in the economy, whereas the second denotes the transfer of
assets from the former state, or public, sector to private
owners. Privatization of the economy is not achieved exclu-
sively through the state sector privatization but also  and, in
the Polish case, actually to a far greater extent  through the
spontaneous emergence of new private companies. Similar-
ly, state policies on the privatization of the economy focus on
encouraging new private domestic and foreign businesses to
enter the market and establishing an environment which
facilitates their development, while policies on public sector
9 CASE Reports No. 18
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[1] Under the first privatization program (announced in November 1990) 15 per cent of the state assets were to be privatized in 1991 and 20 per
cent in each of the subsequent three years. See also Podstawowe kierunki... (1990).
[2] See Ministry of Privatization (1991).
[3] Moreover, in many cases an open hostility against foreign capital investment was expressed. See comparative opinion polls on the attitude
toward foreign investments in Poland and Russia in summer 1992. (B³aszczyk and D¹browski, 1993), p. 76.10
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privatization aim at replacing the state as an owner with
other entities. Both groups of policies are equally important
and closely linked with each other.
I.2. Privatization Concept and Legal
Framework
The Act of 13 July, 1990, on the Privatization of State
Enterprises constituted a compromise between a number of
different concepts. While adopting the flotation of shares
(which provides the greatest revenues to the budget) as the
primary privatization method, the law also gave substantial
privileges to employees and laid the groundwork for a future
mass (voucher) privatization program [4]. On the other hand,
the law failed to settle the problems of restitution and/or
compensation for previous owners whose property had been
nationalized by the Communist regime. Two main privatiza-
tion methods were provided for under the act. The first,
called capital (or indirect) privatization, is used for large state
enterprises and consists of two stages: first, the enterprise is
commercialized (that is, transformed into a joint stock com-
pany wholly owned by the State Treasury), and second, shares
in the newly established companies are made available to pri-
vate investors through public offerings, tenders or negotia-
tions following a public invitation. The second method,
referred to as liquidation (or direct) privatization, involves
transfer of a given enterprises assets or an organized portion
thereof to private investors. Under this method three options
are available, namely: (i) sale; (ii) in-kind contribution to a
company; and (iii) leasing. The last method is targeted at
acquisition of small enterprises by their management and
employees. State enterprises in the agriculture sector are pri-
vatized according to different principles, provided for under a
separate law (The Act of 19 October, 1991, on Management
of Agriculture Property of the State Treasury).
These new privatization methods were supplemented
by liquidations conducted under the State Enterprise Law of
25 September, 1981 (applicable to enterprises with poor
financial standing) as well as bankruptcy and various types of
debtorcreditor arrangements. In April 1993, following
lengthy discussions, the Act on National Investment Funds
(NIF) was finally adopted. This law formed the basis for the
mass privatization program, allowing every adult Polish citi-
zen to acquire a portion of national assets for a nominal
charge. The NIF program was supposed to accelerate the
pace of privatization, at the same time providing for restruc-
turing of enterprises prior to their privatization, facilitated
by the expertise of the professional management companies
employed by the NIFs. There were 512 enterprises select-
ed for the program, in which 15 NIFs were to participate.
In 1993 two other laws of crucial importance for the pri-
vatization process were adopted. The first law referred to
financial restructuring of enterprises and state-owned banks
and enabled such banks to launch debt reduction proceedings
which allowed for conversion of debt into equity (the Act of 3
February, 1993, on Financial Restructuring of Enterprises and
Banks). The second exempted a group of enterprises consid-
ered to be of strategic importance for the state from privati-
zation based on generally applicable rules (155 enterprises
were selected from the coal, power and defense industries,
for which special privatization procedures were to be applied).
In the first half of 1993, due to the slow pace of privatiza-
tion and various constraints hampering the process, work
began on amendments to the 1990 Act. In August 1996,
lengthy debates were brought to an end and a new privatiza-
tion law was adopted. This law gives employees a more privi-
leged position with respect to acquisition of shares in their
companies and establishes special privatization procedures for
indebted enterprises and those of strategic importance [5]. As
for so-called direct privatization, the new law allows out-
siders to put forward privatization initiatives without the need
for seeking approval of the insiders; however, it also reduces
the number of enterprises eligible for this type of privatization
by introducing very low ceilings on the size of enterprises con-
sidered eligible [6]. Additionally, while the employees of the
enterprises privatized according to this method do not receive
15 per cent of the shares for free, as in the case of capital pri-
vatization, under the new law they may receive the equivalent
thereof paid to their accounts in the companys social fund.
The new law, by itself, is in our view not likely to change
the privatization practice in any dramatic way. However, on 1
October, 1996, implementation of the reform of the central
government administration began which included, among
others, important changes in the institutional order in the area
of privatization. A new Ministry of the Treasury has been
CASE Reports No. 18
[4] In cases in which commercial methods were used (referred to in Poland as capital, or indirect, privatization) employees had the right to acquire
up to 20 per cent of their companys shares at a preferential price (50 per cent of the issue price). In cases of liquidation, or direct privatization, in
which the leasing method was used, employees had the priority over other bidders. In all cases (excluding liquidation on the basis of the 1981 state
enterprise law for reasons of poor financial standing), employees and management had the right to veto any privatization proposal.
[5] Employees may acquire up to 15 per cent of the shares in their companies free of charge. A further 15 per cent is available free of charge to
farmers and fishermen supplying a given company on a permanent basis. Former employees on retirement and disability pensions also have the right
to obtain shares from this pool. The shares acquired free of charge may not be sold for two years following acquisition, and for three years in the case
of managerial employees. The law also gives the government the right to extend these periods.
[6] Under the new law only enterprises employing up to 500 persons the annual sales of up to ECU 6 million and own funds of up to ECU 2 mil-
lion may be privatized using the direct privatization methods.11
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established, which has assumed the responsibilities of the for-
mer Ministry of Privatization. The new Ministry is responsible
for the supervision of all state-owned assets and only one of
its functions will be privatization. Smaller enterprises will be
privatized by the regional governments (voivodes) by the use
of direct privatization methods. From the latter change a
more efficient privatization may be expected, due to the
decentralization of the privatization process [Balcerowicz,
B³aszczyk, and D¹browski, 1996].
I.3.Privatization Tracks and Their Results
Implementation of the privatization programs in accor-
dance with the principles discussed above started in August
1990. By the end of that year six large enterprises had
undergone capital privatization in the form of initial public
offerings. The scale of capital privatization operations was
broadened in 1991. Nevertheless, every enterprise was pri-
vatized on an individual basis, applying lengthy and compli-
cated procedures, which considerably slowed down the
entire process. Direct privatization of small and medium-
sized enterprises, usually by leasing to employees and man-
agement, proved quicker and more effective. The NIF pro-
gram was designed to speed up the privatization process,
but its implementation did not begin until the end of 1995.
In the first half of 1997, the NIF program entered a more
advanced stage, with shares of the 15 funds being listed on
the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
Table 1 depicts proportions between the group of
enterprises having initiated privatization processes between
the end of 1990 and December 1996 and those in which
CASE Reports No. 18
Table 1. State enterprises which have initiated ownership transformation procedures, by type of privatization (December 19901996)
Number of state enterprises (in parentheses:
as % of state enterprises existing
on 31 December, 1990)
Share of completed cases
Existing on 31 December, 1990 8,441
(100)
Comments % of started
transformations
in the group
Transformed into companies  wholly









Transformed into companies under
Law on Ownership Transformation
of Enterprises of Special Importance
160
(1.9)
Temporarily not subject to
privatization

Liquidated under Law on




1,221 projects completed 97.9









Taken over by the Agency for




Leased, subject to management
contract or sold






Turned over to local governments













Note: From December 1996 (including transfer to local governments and all forms of liquidation)
Sources: Central Statistical Office (1997), Privatization of State Enterprises as of 31 December, 1996, Warsaw, Small Statistical Yearbook 1997, pp.
36062 and authors calculations12
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privatization has been completed. Out of 1227 enterprises
transformed into companies wholly owned by the State
Treasury, only 183 have completed the capital privatization
process; while 512 of these companies were included in the
NIF program, their complete privatization will take a few
more years.
Almost all direct privatization projects have been com-
pleted (1221 out of 1247), whereas less than one third (494
out of 1464) of the liquidation projects commenced under
the State Enterprise Law have been completed. Thus,
between December 1990 and the end of 1996, 5592 (66.2
per cent) of the total of 8441 state enterprises existing at
the outset of the process had initiated the transformation
processes, but only 1898 (22.4 per cent) had managed to
complete it.
With respect to the sectoral breakdown of transformed
enterprises from 1990 through June 1996, the relative
importance of ownership transformations is much greater in
the manufacturing sector than in other segments of the
economy. Within the manufacturing sector, in turn, the
largest number of transformed enterprises are active in the
processing branch, which by far outperforms the other sec-
tors (mining, power, gas and water supply) in terms of trans-
formation pace (Figure 1). As of the end of 1996, the major-
ity of large enterprises in such utilities as power, gas and
water supply, as well as in transportation and telecommuni-
cations, were excluded from the ownership transformation
process. The numerical data illustrating the privatization
progress in various parts of the economy need to be sup-
plemented with a brief description of the qualitative effects
encountered on the individual paths of privatization.
Capital privatization has been applied in 183 large com-
panies, mostly from food and beverages, tobacco, chemi-
cals, electrical appliances, machinery and the garment indus-
try, moreover a few large banks were included. Though lim-
ited in quantitative terms, this type of privatization has been
of great importance for the economy in view of the size of
the enterprises concerned, their market positions, number
of employees and the fact that they represented important
branches of the economy. Due to resource limitations of
potential domestic investors, around 50 per cent of the cap-
ital privatization projects involved foreign capital. The sale
of shares in these enterprises facilitated the establishment
and development of the Polish capital market and was the
main source of privatization proceeds to the state budget. In
qualitative terms, the majority of enterprises privatized
through capital privatization  in particular those with for-
eign capital involvement  are showing high growth; they
have engaged in deep restructuring [D¹browski, 1995]. The
high degree of centralization of the administrative proce-
dures applied in capital privatization and its strong sensitivi-
ty to political constraints are among the main weaknesses of
capital privatization.
Different measures need to be used when assessing the
effects of commercialization in cases in which this was not
followed by privatization (approximately 400 cases). One
has to be extremely cautious in evaluating the significance of
this process for the progress of ownership transformations,
since commercialization is primarily a formal and legal stage
which does not automatically lead to further changes in a
given enterprise. In spite of this reservation, it should be
added that in our opinion, given the current situation, com-
mercialization  even without subsequent privatization 
may have certain disciplining effects due to the increased
transparency and improved control mechanisms which fol-
low from the introduction of new accounting rules and stan-
dards in the commercialized enterprises as well as the oblig-
ation to publish their financial results.
CASE Reports No. 18
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Manufacturing Electricity, water and gas
supply13
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Yet another set of considerations applies to the compa-
nies included in the NIF program. After the special Govern-
ment Selection Committee had selected supervisory board
members and managers of the funds, paired the funds with
management companies and completed negotiations on the
funds management, the operating phase of the program
began in June 1995 with allocation of company shares to the
funds. Ultimately, majority stakes in 512 companies wholly
owned by the State Treasury were turned over to the 15
National Investment Funds, whose tasks included restruc-
turing and privatizing those companies [7]. The manage-
ment companies which manage the funds are responsible
for improving the financial results of the companies held by
the funds, which they may do by directly or indirectly par-
ticipating in the companies restructuring or by supporting
the privatization process and seeking strategic investors;
they may also sell or liquidate the companies. Portfolio
investment will be one of the important features of the
NIFs activities.
Certificates for shares in the NIFs were distributed to
the public between November 1995 and November 1996
and, according to official data, the vast majority of eligible
Poles (25.7 million) purchased the certificates, paying a reg-
istration fee which by the end of the distribution period was
seven to eight times lower than the market value of the
share certificate.  A half year later (June 1997) 15 millions of
certificates were dematerialized (put into the computerized
system of the Warsaw Stock Exchange) [8]. The certificates
may be freely traded on the over-the-counter market and
the stock exchange. Since the shares in the NIFs have been
listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange since May 1997, every
certificate is convertible into 15 shares, one in each NIF .  At
the end of June 1997, 5 million certificates had been con-
verted already into the NIF shares. The funds started their
operations with analyses of their majority holdings in order
to prepare restructuring or sale plans. The funds were also
obliged to present their consolidated balance sheets for the
first year of operation (1995) as well as the adjusted balance
sheets of their companies in order for the Securities Com-
mission to approve trading of those companies shares on
the stock exchange. The first year has shown that the funds
have been active and varied in the character of their activi-
ty, developing restructuring and investment plans adjusted
to the unique characteristics of their portfolios. Plans have
been made to sell off enterprises with good financial stand-
ing while restructuring others which require more profound
preparation for privatization. By August 1996, the funds
submitted projects which planned the sale of 76 of the 512
companies. One year later, the sale of 21 companies out of
31 prepared transactions was already completed. The stock
exchange listing of some 60 to 70 companies was also
planned and eight of them entered the Warsaw Stock
Exchange.  In spring 1996, the sale of minority stakes com-
menced, in particular those of cement industry companies.
On the average, NIF companies are of medium size
(2001000 employees), and operate chiefly in the manufac-
turing or construction sectors. The manufacturing compa-
nies are dominated by machinery and equipment, foods and
beverages, and the chemical, construction materials, metal-
lurgy and garment industries. 
Over recent years the overall financial standing of NIF
companies has deteriorated in comparison with compa-
nies not participating in the NIF program, generally due to
the following reasons: first, while waiting for implementa-
tion of the program, many of the most financially sound
companies attracted strategic investors for capital privati-
zation and left the NIF program; second, a large number
of enterprises selected for mass privatization spent two or
more years in a state of uncertainty and idleness, without
any restructuring effort. Finally, the funds, in order to
meet the new accounting rules and prudential standards
which follow from the 1994 accounting law, introduced
high reserves backing every expected kinds of risks, at the
enterprises level and at the funds level, which proved to
be costly.
Through 31 December, 1996, direct privatization
through liquidation, designed for small and medium-sized
enterprises, had been launched in 1247 enterprises and
completed in 1221. The fastest and the most popular
method for transfer of ownership rights in Poland, direct
privatization, may often be classified as a quasi-sale
method due to the payment deferment and the existence
of various regulations facilitating purchase on favorable
conditions.
Most cases of direct privatization involve leasing of
assets to a company established by the employees of the
liquidated state enterprise; there have been fewer enter-
prises sold or contributed in kind to a company [9].
Despite serious concerns about the future of the so-called
employee-owned companies, their financial results so far
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[7] The shares were allocated in the following manner: 60 per cent of the total shares of each company was entrusted with the funds, 15 per cent
given free of charge to the employees and the remaining 25 per cent being temporarily held by the state treasury with a view to later supporting pen-
sion funds and compensating holders of various claims on the state treasury. In accordance with the law, the 60 per cent of each companys shares dis-
tributed among the 15 funds were divided into majority and minority stakes in order to avoid excessive dispersion of shares. More specifically, 33 per
cent of each companys shares was vested in one of the 15 funds, while the other 27 per cent was evenly distributed among the remaining 14. The
minority stakes can be freely traded, while the majority stakes can be sold only en bloc.
[8] Central Statistical Office (1997) p. 16.
[9] As of December 1996, 66 per cent of direct privatization transactions were leasing arrangements, 21.6 per cent were direct sales, and only 6.2
per cent cases of in kind contribution to a company (see Ministerstwo Skarbu Pañstwa, 1996b).14
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are generally better than expected, although investment
volume is still insufficient. The research conducted so far
proves that these enterprises currently have very diversi-
fied ownership structures, ranging from very concentrat-
ed to highly dispersed [Jarosz, 1996]. When negotiation of
the State Enterprise Pact began in 1992, the pace of the
direct privatization process decreased substantially. While
this could possibly be a result of the shrinking of the pool
of financially sound small and medium-sized state enter-
prises, it appears that the overwhelming factor was the
decision of enterprises to wait for the adoption of a new
privatization law, expected to provide better financial con-
ditions for this type of privatization. It is not yet possible
to assess to what extent further direct privatization oper-
ations will be impacted by the new (1996) law. One may
reasonably assume that the pace of the process will large-
ly depend on the determination of the voivods (to whom
the power to privatize most small enterprises has been
transferred), the capacity of voivodship institutions and
initiatives of the regional offices of the Ministry of the State
Treasury. As the results show, privatization slowed down
even more in 1997.
Liquidation under the State Enterprise Act is triggered by
poor financial standing of the enterprise concerned; privati-
zation should therefore be viewed as a byproduct of the
process. Nonetheless, any liquidation under the provisions
of article 19 of this law materially supports privatization by
enabling small private companies to purchase the assets of
the enterprise under liquidation at a relatively low price.
Although these enterprises cannot continue to function in
their current form, their assets and  labor force may be
effectively used by others. However, the procedure is much
more complex and lengthy than direct privatization. As of
December 1996, liquidation had been initiated in 1464 state
enterprises, but only 494 (33.7 per cent) of these liquida-
tions had been completed, with the rest still in progress.
Another group of 441 enterprises being in liquidation went
into bankruptcy procedures. 
Since 1990 a large number of SOEs have been declared
bankrupt or have had to engage in arrangement proceed-
ings. As of December 1996 around 662 state enterprises
had been declared bankrupt or subject to court arrange-
ment proceedings. In some cases creditors took over the
enterprises and became their new owners. Moreover,
between 1993 and 1996, under the Act on Financial
Restructuring of Enterprises and Banks, state banks
launched conciliatory proceedings involving 196 indebted
state enterprises and companies wholly owned by the
State Treasury. The law provided for the following meth-
ods of enterprise restructuring: bank conciliatory agree-
ments, public sale of debts owed to banks, conversion of
debt into equity and liquidation or receivership. In Decem-
ber 1996 the files maintained by the Ministry of Privatiza-
tion contained 128 cases of debt-equity conversions. Only
13 bank conciliatory proceedings have been fully complet-
ed at that time [10]. The conversion procedures, in addi-
tion to reducing financial tension in the firms involved, may
lead to partial, and in some cases complete, privatization.
I.4. De novo Private Sector Development
De novo privatization, that is, private sector develop-
ment through the establishment of brand new companies,
proved to be of particular importance in Poland. The
spontaneous expansion of the private sector has been the
most dynamic phenomenon in the entire transition to a
market economy. The de novo private sector has also been
the one with the fastest growth of production, sales and
investments. This generated a large number of jobs, thus
counteracting the rise in unemployment. If we look at the
rates of growth of the numbers of enterprises in the pri-
vate and public sectors, we note that the fastest growth
was in the number of private companies and companies
with foreign capital. Between 1989 and 1996 the number
of private businesses owned by individuals more than dou-
bled, from 813,000 to 1.95 million [11]. Starting up small
private businesses was made relatively easy by the liberal,
straightforward registration requirements and commercial
regulations as well as the availability for buying, at rela-
tively low prices, assets formerly belonging to state enter-
prises. This is evidence that effective privatization meth-
ods, decentralization of decision-making regarding dispos-
al of state enterprise assets and other favorable systemic
solutions were all important factors in private sector
revival. 
The so-called small privatization process, affecting the
retail trade, catering and service sectors, also proved
extremely successful in the process of ownership transfor-
mation in Poland. During the operation, conducted
between 1990 and 1992, approximately 97 per cent of
retail and small service outlets and restaurants were priva-
tized [Earle et al., 1994]. As a result of small privatization,
by the end of 1992 over 90 per cent of the domestic trade
sector  labor force worked in private companies, with this
share increasing to 94 per cent by the end of 1995.
Between 1990 and 1995 the number of private shops dou-
bled (from 223 113 to 419 313), and their sales increased
almost tenfold (from PLN 16,926.0 million to PLN
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157,025.5 million in current prices). Today the vast major-
ity of small shops and businesses are private, although
most of the real estate on which they are located is owned
by the local authorities. A similar development occurred in
the wholesale trade sector, where sales increased almost
17 times (from PLN 10,477 million in 1991 to PLN
176,555 million in current prices in 1995).
I.5. Foreign Investment
The ability to attract foreign investment to enter the
Polish market was limited in the initial stage of transforma-
tion, due to high risk resulting from the high inflation rate,
the immense and unsettled foreign debt, the disastrous sit-
uation of numerous enterprises following the stabilization
shock, and the unpredictable effects of the reforms and
prejudices of a part of the society and certain politicians
against foreign investors. This changed over time, and in
particular after 1993, when the pace of the Polish econo-
mys growth accelerated and the foreign debt had been suc-
cessfully restructured. The general reception of foreign
investors has also gradually improved. These factors
encouraged foreign investors to expand their operations on
the Polish market. In addition to the incentives associated
with the high growth rate, Polands international treaties
(World Trade Organization, European Treaty and other) are
an important factor in ensuring economic stability.
The Act of 14 June, 1991, on Companies with Foreign
Capital is the legal basis for foreign investment. In adopt-
ing this law, the Polish Parliament decided that the same
regulations should apply to foreign and domestic investors;
tax allowances or other special incentives for foreign
investors were therefore dropped, with the exception of
large-scale investment projects implemented in regions
with high rates of structural unemployment or those of
exceptional scientific and technical value. However, the
principle of equal treatment of Polish and foreign investors
is still not applied consistently. Restrictions affecting land
acquisition, remaining following liberalization of relevant
legislation in April 1996, still constitute the main legal bar-
rier to foreign investment. On the other hand regulations
requiring foreign investors to obtain permits in order to
operate in certain business areas were lifted. The intro-
duction of tax exemptions linked with exports and invest-
ments and promotion of special economic zones protect-
ing investors were further measures, taken in 199394 in
order to attract investors  both domestic and foreign.
Nevertheless, a general opinion exists that the greatest
existing barrier for foreign investments in Poland results
from bureaucratic procedures and frequent local hesitance
with respect to foreign investments. As for large-scale
infrastructure projects, the government has not shown a
consistent strategy, no transparent and effective proce-
dures have been put in place and certain areas lack ade-
quate legislation [Carter et al., 1996].
Under the relevant legislation, foreign direct invest-
ments may take the form of a capital share in an already
existing or newly founded joint-stock or limited liability
company. A foreign investor may also extend a long-term
loan to a company. The profits on direct investments may
be re-invested or transferred outside Poland without
restriction. By the end of 1996 roughly 28 000 enterprises
with foreign capital participation were operating in Poland.
However, according to the data of the State Foreign Invest-
ment Agency, only in 492 such enterprises did the value of
foreign inputs exceed USD 1 million [12]. By the end of
1995 large scale foreign investments (valued at more than
USD    1 million) in Poland totaled USD 6.8 billion (PAIZ,
1996), and smaller scale investments were estimated at
USD 1.8 billion. Therefore, the total investment volume
totaled USD 8.5 billion. The total value of additional com-
mitments relating to the investments was estimated in 1995
at USD 5.2 billion.
In 1996, there was again a high increase of the foreign
investment inflow, reaching more than  USD 5 billion. Alto-
gether a total of USD 12,227 billion in foreign direct invest-
ments (large scale investments) flowed to Poland between
1990 and 1996, increasing steeply every year. From 1993
through 1996, the inflow of foreign direct investments dou-
bled each year. According to the most recent estimates of
the State Foreign Investment Agency, it is expected that in
1997 such investments will grow in a slower pace and their
inflow will reach approximately USD 3.5 billion (Rzecz-
pospolita, 16 April and 9 September, 1997). One may sug-
gest that the reason for this is the slower pace of structural
reforms in Poland during the most recent years and in the
lack of large privatization projects, especially in infrastruc-
tural sectors. 
If we consider the largest foreign investments in Poland
in terms of branches, the manufacturing sector leads the list,
followed by the financial, construction, services and power
sectors. 1995 saw a relatively rapid increase in investments
in manufacturing, as a result of which this sector accounted
for 63.3 per cent of the total value of foreign investments
(data from State Foreign Investment Agency). With respect
to nationality, the foreign investors group is led by Ameri-
cans, followed by multinational companies, Germans,
French and Italians. In terms of single investors, the largest
amounts in the period were invested by Fiat, the EBRD and
the PolishAmerican Enterprise Fund.
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I.6. Macroeconomic Results and Changes 
in the Ownership Structure
Following eight years of transformation, the extent of pri-
vatization of the economy  in the broad sense  is significant.
The private sector share in GDP grew from 30 per cent in
1989 to around 60 per cent in 1995 [13]. By the end of 1996
the private sectors share in total industrial output was 51.7
per cent; corresponding figures for construction and domes-
tic trade were 87.9 and 92.9 per cent respectively. In the
transport and communication sector the share of the private
output remained at a lower level of 39.5 per cent. The private
sectors share in foreign trade amounted to 62.8 per cent of
exports and to 75.6 per cent of imports. Additionally, the sec-
tor (including agriculture) employed 65 per cent of the entire
labor force (Central Statistical Office, Small Statistical Year-
book 1997, pp. 3516), see Tables 2 and 3.
Together with the changes in the ownership structure,
important changes in the physical structure of the economy
emerged. The share of the industrial sector in GDP declined
from 44.9 per cent in 1990 to 27.5 per cent in 1996. The
share of agriculture (together with forestry, fishing and hunt-
ing) fell from 7.2 per cent to 5.8 per cent and that of con-
struction from 9.2 to 5.3 per cent. The share of retail trade
and repair services was estimated in 1996 at 14.3 per cent
(estimates of the Central Statistical Office, Small Statistical
Yearbook 1997, p. 341). However, despite these massive
changes, from the point of view of GDP production, indus-
try is still the dominant sector [14]. The second most impor-
tant place belongs to the trade and repair sector. Agricul-
ture, though employing 28 per cent of the total workforce,
produces only 5.8 per cent of GDP , which is evidence of
very low  labor productivity in this sector. It should be noted
that the public sector, despite the drop to 35 per cent of the
total  labor force employed, continues to hold over one half
of national assets (59.7 per cent of book value in 1995) and
still has a high share in total investment, 55.8 per cent in
1995 (Small Statistical Yearbook 1997, p. 351).
There are substantial differences between the composi-
tion of production in the private and public sectors. In the
public sector, industry is responsible for the majority of value
added, with the remainder produced by services, transporta-
tion and a very small share of other sectors. In the private sec-
tor it is trade that contributes the most to value added, fol-
lowed by manufacturing and services; agriculture and con-
struction are less significant. This also means that the private
sector performs an important role in modernizing the struc-
ture of the economy (through the gradual reduction of the
significance of manufacturing). The private sector has become
the Polish economys engine of growth. Between 1991 and
1995 the annual increase in value added in the sector was
between 7.0 per cent and 26.7 per cent, whereas in the pub-
lic sector value added declined continually until 1994, when
slight (2.8 per cent) growth was reported [B³aszczyk,
Bratkowski, and D¹browski, 1996]. For example, in 1995
value added in the private sector increased by 15 per cent
compared with only 3 per cent in the public sector.
The growth of private investment was remarkable, too;
its share in total investments rose by more than 40 per cent
in 1996 [Koniunktura gospodarcza Polski, 1997]. During the
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Table 2. The private sectors share in output and employment
Sector of the
economy

























































a: private sector share in output, %
b: private sector share in employment in the sector, %
Sources: Central Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, 1991, and Small Statistic Yearbook 199497
[13] According to official statistics, in 1989 the private sector share in GDP was only 19.2 per cent, and the share of the private non-agricultural
sector 9.2 per cent. Cooperatives, then generating approximately 10 per cent of GDP , were not included in the private sector, but rather in the so-
called collectivized sector. In order to facilitate comparative analysis we have included cooperatives in the private sector for the entire period; hence
the 30 per cent figure. For 1995: OECD estimates. See also, B³aszczyk, Bratkowski and D¹browski (1996).
[14] Excluding non-material services, tariffs and taxes, for which the importance of GDP is systematically growing.17
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time under consideration massive shifts in employment
among sectors emerged as well. The rising share of employ-
ment in the private sector illustrates its scale in the econo-
my. Together with private agriculture, employment in the
private sector reached 50 per cent of the total workforce as
early as 1990 and at the end of 1996 amounted to 65 per
cent. If we look closer at the structure of employment
(excluding agriculture) in the private sector in Table 3, we
can see other important shifts. Here we can see that
employment in the remaining private sector (without coop-
eratives) rose from 1.8 to 5.2 million between 1989 and
1996. This figure includes persons employed in all private
companies and partnerships, but primarily consists of the
large number of self-employed. At the same time employ-
ment in the cooperative sector shrank from 2.2 to 0.6 mil-
lion. Altogether employment in the private sector rose from
8.2 to 10.0 million. On the other hand, the workforce in the
public sector shrank from 9.3 to 5.4 million, that is by 3.9
million, and total employment in the economy declined
from 17.5 to 15.4 million, that is by 2.1 million. This means
that the private sector employed a significant number of
former public sector employees and also a large number of
former employees of the socialized cooperative sector,
which became private and underwent serious restructuring.
The share of private employment in different sectors of
the economy remains uneven. In industry, this share was
29.1 per cent in 1989 and it rose very gradually, not reach-
ing the threshold of 50 per cent until the end of 1995 and
amounting to 53.4 per cent in 1996. In construction it rose
very steeply from 37.4 per cent in 1989 to 85 per cent in
1996. In domestic trade as early as 1989 private employ-
ment (including cooperatives) accounted for 72.7 per cent,
and its share increased to 94.8 per cent by 1996. Among the
sectors of material production and trade shown in this table,
transportation is the only one where the share of the pri-
vate sector is still lower than 30 per cent (due to the state-
owned railways, ports, airlines, postal service, telecommu-
nication, and so on, belonging to that sector). If we includ-
ed in this table other infrastructural sectors and showed the
structure of industrial employment in more detail, the
uneven degree of privatization among sectors and branches
would be much more evident.
The share of private employment was over 80 per cent
in construction and over 90 per cent in agriculture and trade
in 1996. In some kind of services (such as real estate) it
amounted to more than 60 per cent, but it was almost
absent in some other services, such as education (3.4 per
cent) or health and social services (4.5 per cent). In the
three main divisions of industry the share of the private sec-
tor is very uneven. On average, industry is 55.2 per cent pri-
vatized. But as we can see in the table, whereas private
employment reached 64.9 per cent in the manufacturing
sector, in both remaining sectors of industry (mining and
quarrying and electricity, gas and water supply) it stands at
3.3 and 4.5 per cent respectively [15] (Figure 2).
It is important to note that the impressive structural
shifts between the public and the private sectors described
above have not been achieved in the way that was expect-
ed at the beginning of the reform process. The explosion of
newly-founded private firms was the main driving force
behind ownership transformation, followed by the decen-
tralized bottom-up, or direct, methods of privatization of
state property. The contribution of centralized, top-down
privatization methods controlled by the government and
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Sectors 1989 1996
Private Sector 4.0 4.2
 non-agricultural 1.8 5.2
Total private sector 5.8 9.4
Semi-private sector
 cooperatives 2.2 0.6
 other  socialised entities 0.2 NA




 state ownership 9.3 3.9
 local government ownership  1.2
Total employment in the national
economy 17.5 15.4
Sources: Central Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, 1991, and



















public sector private sector
Figure 2. The share of the private and the public sector
in employment by branches
Table 3. Employment in the national economy  by sectors,
in millions
[15] Authors own calculations based on Central Statistical Office, Small Statistical Yearbook 1997, pp. 3523.18
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much more under the influence of political fluctuations has
been much smaller. An important factor in changing the
whole economic structure was also the systematic contrac-
tion of the public sector. Evidence for these claims can be
found in the fact that former public enterprises comprise
only a small part of the private sector with regard to their
share in employment and the employed assets.
This is illustrated by the following facts: As of the end of
1996, in the privatized sector (that is, formerly state-
owned enterprises) over 400.000 persons were employed,
whereas the entire private non-agricultural sector employed
over 5 million persons (out of 15 million employed persons
in the entire economy, of which 10 million were in the non-
agricultural sector). Thus, employment in the privatized
sector represented 8 per cent of private sector employment
and 2.6 per cent of total employment (see Tables 2 and 3).
The entire group of enterprises which had initiated owner-
ship transformation processes (whether completed or not)
employed slightly less than 1.5 million persons, or about 10
per cent of the national labor force (and 30 per cent of
employment in the private sector). Although this figure indi-
cates that while this group of enterprises constitutes an
important element of the Polish economy, it does not alter
the fact that the vast bulk of Polands private sector (in
terms of human and productive potential) is made up of de
novo private enterprises rather than privatized ones. It is the
de novo private sector which was responsible for the high
rate of economic growth in Poland in recent years. The sec-
tors growth can be seen not only in the rapid expansion of
the number of enterprises, but also in the rates of growth of
production, sales, and investment, which are higher than
those for any other sector of the economy. In short, the
expansion of the de novo private sector has been the most
dynamic phenomenon in the entire market transformation
of Poland.
We may conclude that, for numerous reasons, the priva-
tization approach in Poland has been pluralistic. Some of the
methods used have proved successful, some have failed.
Poland is behind other countries in terms of privatization of
the largest heavy industrial enterprises and infrastructure.
On the other hand, impressive results have been accom-
plished in development of the de novo private sector. The
small and direct privatization programs used for small and
medium-sized state enterprises and driven by bottom-up
initiatives, have also been successful. The rate of inflow of
foreign direct investments to Poland is increasing, bringing
obvious benefits for the restructuring process. The figures
and statistical analyses cited above constitute strong evi-
dence that private sector growth in Poland has to be attrib-
uted primarily to the spontaneous development of new
firms under liberal systemic conditions, aided by the decline
and partial disintegration of the state sector. However,
despite this impressive spontaneous private sector develop-
ment, the extent of privatization of the economy, measured
by the private sectors share in GDP , employment and
assets, is still unsatisfactory. In reviewing the qualitative
effects of privatization we have to admit that only some of
the targeted goals have been met.
Through privatization a rapidly developing capital market
was established in Poland. Many hold that the Polish securities
market is the best organized, most transparent and promising
in Central Europe. The State Treasury was strengthened with
direct proceeds from privatization, which, though moderate in
volume, have been important for the consolidation of the bud-
get [16]. One may expect that in the future the state budget
will indirectly benefit from privatization, for example due to
reductions in subsidies to the public sector and increasing tax
revenues from private enterprises [17]. The eight years of
transformation have proven beyond doubt that privatization
supported with competition stimulates the increase of enter-
prise effectiveness. Significant accomplishments have been
recorded in the restructuring of large enterprises through
commercial procedures, particularly with foreign investors
participation [Kamiñski, 1996].
The state sector has diminished, though to a lesser
extent than originally planned. The overall result of the pri-
vatization process is unsatisfactory due to the continuing
large number of state enterprises, the substantial value of
assets still within the public sector and the uneven pace of
privatization in certain sectors, especially in infrastructure,
which so far has been excluded from privatization. Addi-
tionally, there is still insufficient popular support for privati-
zation, because many hopes and expectations linked with it
have not been fulfilled.
I.7. Results of Previous Research 
on Enterprise Restructuring in Poland
During the seven years of transformation in Poland
described above (199096), deep changes occurred in the
behavior of enterprises. These changes have been described
in numerous empirical and statistical studies. The best
known statistical research is the ranking of the 500 largest
manufacturing enterprises, led by the Institute of Economics
of the Polish Academy of Sciences since the early 1980s. Its
scope has been broadened during the 1990s, so that besides
the largest manufacturing companies in the public sector,
lists have been prepared on the largest companies in the
public and private sector and separately on other sectors
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outside manufacturing. On the basis of the company level
data numerous papers and books on different aspects of
enterprise restructuring have been published [for instance,
Muj¿el, 1997].
Among the most important empirical research on
enterprise restructuring during the early transition
in Poland are studies by Pinto, Belka and Krajewski
(1993), followed up in later years with research in a larg-
er group of enterprises [Belka et al., 1995], and empirical
research conducted by the Gdañsk Institute of Market
Economics since 1990 in both state enterprises and a
group of enterprises (starting from 60 and finishing with
about 150) undergoing different types of ownership
transformation [18]
It is very difficult to compare or to generalize the out-
comes of these empirical studies since none of them is
based on a representative sample and are related to dif-
ferent groups of enterprises. On the other hand, the sta-
tistical research, which is more representative, may not
answer many interesting questions because of the massive
changes in the statistical methodology which occurred
during this period of time. One should also realize that all
ranking lists with their rich information include changing
samples of enterprises, so that it is not possible to observe
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Enterprise sector, total 
d) 4,626.0 97.1 1.6 22.2
Enterprises which have begun  ownership
transformation 
e) 1,496.3 97.9 0.9 19.8
Companies wholly owned by the state
treasury, of which:
1,064.3 99.0 0.4 16.4
 prepared for individual capital
privatization
396.9 97.8 1.8 22.9
 prepared for NIF 358.5 100.2 - 1.6 13.5
- others 308.9 100.2 - 1.4 9.9
Companies in which capital privatization
was completed, of which: 175.1 95.6 2.3 31.5
 with foreign capital 68.9 96.4 1.8 24.9
Companies established from liquidated
state enterprises,
Of which:
58.2 99.7 - 0.9 23.1
 with foreign capital 21.9 99.1 - 1.0 28.9
Employee-owned companies 186.2 94.0 3.4 22.4
State enterprises in liquidation, of which: 12.5 110.1 - 5.8 9.3
 under the state enterprise law 6.3 131.4 - 16.3 8.8
 under the privatization law 6.2 99.0 - 0.3 10.9
State enterprises not having begun
ownership transformation 771.6 98.4 0.4 25.2
Public enterprises, total 2,619.9 97.8 1.0 23.1
Notes:
a) Ratio of costs to total revenue
b) Ratio of net profit or loss to total revenue
c) Ratio of current assets to current liabilities
d) All enterprises employing over 50 employees
e) Including those which have completed privatization
Source: Central Statistical Office, Financial Results of Economic Entities, January-December 1996, in Privatization of State Enterprises as of 
31 December, 1996, Warsaw 1997
[18] See Ekonomiczne i spo³eczne efekty prywatyzacji poredniej i bezporedniej. Analiza porównawcza kondycji ekonomicznej i dzia³añ dos-
tosowawczych przedsiêbiorstw objêtych przekszta³ceniami w³asnociowymi w latach 1990-95 (1996), Instytut Badañ nad Gospodark¹ Rynkow¹,
Gdañsk-Warszawa, and D¹browski et al. (1991, 1993).20
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changes in the same sample (an exception is Grosfeld and
Nivet, 1998.) In many cases, a large amount of quantitative
information is accompanied by a deficit of qualitative infor-
mation, necessary in order to explain the reasons behind
observed changes. Therefore, it is possible to conduct
econometric analyses, but it is very difficult to interpret
the results of these analyses. However, all these studies
and available official statistics allow us to draw a general
picture on the adjustment behavior and restructuring
effects on enterprises:
1. The adjustment behavior of all types of enterprises
has shown many similarities during consecutive stages of
transformation. Most authors distinguish two [Belka, 1996]
or three such stages [M¹czyñska and Zawadzki, 1997].
The first stage (199091 or 199092) was a period of
severe crisis caused by external shocks linked with the sys-
temic change. While in 1990 many enterprises could still
allow themselves a wait and see approach because of accu-
mulated financial and other reserves, 1991 was a year of a
sharp decline. At that time the enterprises made intensive
efforts to find short-time survival strategies, mostly by
employment cuts, sale of non-productive assets and so on,
and tried to establish new markets for their goods. Produc-
tion and sales, as well as all other economic indicators, fell
sharply. The real indebtedness of enterprises was growing.
The second stage of adjustment identified in the three-stage
approach was in the years 199293 when the enterprises
tried to halt the decreasing trend of production and sales. In
this stage they introduced new sale strategies. The first sign
of recovery was the rise of labor productivity in 1992
accompanied by production increase, but the profitability
indicators of enterprises were still decreasing investment
stagnated. 1993 was the first year when the financial
performance of enterprises recovered and when invest-
ment rose (although net profitability was still negative). The
third stage of adjustment, starting in 1994 (or the second
stage, beginning in 1993 in the two-stage approach), was
characterized by steady production growth, improvement
of profitability, rising net profitability and investment spend-
ing. In 1996 the overall financial performance of enterprises
deteriorated again, but investment and  labor productivity
continued to rise.
2. A surprising result of research conducted during the
first two stages of transition was that privatization seemed
to have little influence on the adjustment and restructuring
patterns of enterprises.
All enterprises, whether privatized, state-owned or
commercialized seemed to react in similar ways to the hard-
ening of budgetary constraints and increasing competition
[19]. In the next stages of reforms, especially since 1994, a
gradual differentiation between restructuring patterns of
enterprises was more and more visible. It is now clear that
privatization matters. With respect to deep (strategic) vs.
defensive restructuring [Grosfeld and Roland, 1996], most
research has shown that the strategic restructuring process,
involving large investments and innovative technological
changes, was possible only in privatized enterprises, mainly
with the participation of a foreign investor. Moreover, the
behavior of enterprises of different ownership types in the
wage setting process has been investigated. The non-priva-
tized enterprises have a tendency to consume the largest
part of  labor productivity increases in wages while the pri-
vatized enterprises use it for further investment [Grosfeld
and Nivet, 1998]. A similar conclusion was made in an inter-
national comparative World Bank study [Pohl et al., 1997].
The differences between privatized and state companies
measured by the indicators of financial and economic per-
formance are becoming striking (see Table 4 above). The
only difference between the conclusions of the World Bank
study and most research done in Poland is that, in our view,
not only privatization by itself but also the methods of pri-
vatization have a strong influence on the quality of the
restructuring process.
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Here, we provide a comparative background to the
analysis of the companies in our sample by investigating eco-
nomic indicators of the relevant industries. We start from a
brief description of production dynamics in manufacturing
and in all branches under investigation. Then, changes in aver-
age employment and wages are investigated. Finally, aggre-
gated data concerning the financial indicators of enterprises in
these branches are presented. These indicators include gross
profitability, the investment to revenue ratio, and the quick
ratio. Table 5 contains basic statistics for the year 1995 on
production, employment, wages, and investment for the
branches represented by the companies in our sample.
2.1. Production in the Manufacturing
Sector, 199096
Production in the centrally planned economy was not
governed by market demand but determined by supply con-
ditions. Relative prices were distorted by the widespread
control and persistent shortages resulted in forced substitu-
tion. Moreover, the administrative allocation of capital and
labor was inefficient, magnifying distortions in the produc-
tion structure. Heavy industry was overdeveloped, mostly
for political reasons. Transformation to the market economy
required fundamental changes in the structure of industrial
production. The first two years of transformation (199091)
were characterized by a severe recession. Industrial produc-
tion fell by ~20 per cent in 1990 and by ~10 per cent in
1991. The reduction was caused by the shock therapy nec-
essary for macroeconomic stabilization, but also by the
process of production restructuring in response to market
signals. The dynamics of sold production of manufacturing
branches (NACE Divisions) are reported in Figures 3 and 4.
The initial decrease was not identical across the
branches. Figure 3 shows that the production of con-
sumer goods fell significantly less than the manufacturing
average. It is obvious that initially repressed demand gave
way to relatively higher consumption and less output fall.
The opposite is true for producers of investment goods
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Manufacturing 211533.1 2616.0 699.27 11732.7
Apparel, Dressing and Dyeing of Fur 6338.5 240.0 499.56 232.5
Food Products 51629.7 452.0 683.81 2694.6
Machinery and Equipment 13689.3 292.0 682.93 584.4
Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 6179.4 87.0 747.51 381.4
Fabricated Metal Products 9367.5 87.0 683.89 325.8
Radio, Television
and Communication Equipment
3348.0 43.0 754.68 151.2
Source: Central Statistical Office, Monthly Statistical Bulletin22
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(with the exception of one branch). A clear-cut difference
between the decrease in investment and consumer
goods production may be difficult to establish because the
latter did not necessarily reflect consumer needs. The
opening up of the Polish economy and large-scale import
of consumer goods extended consumer choice and
allowed for substitution of unwanted products. On the
other hand, the decrease in production caused by the
process of restructuring was cushioned by the initial
devaluation of zloty, which made Polish imports expensive
and exports highly competitive in 1990. In mid-1991
domestic prices adjusted and true competitiveness began
to determine trade flows.
In 1991 the dissolution of the CMEA produced another
large negative demand shock. Trade with the USSR and
other countries of the Eastern block dropped significantly.
Economic links with Western countries were not estab-
lished yet and the shock exerted considerable influence on
the Polish economy. Production in branches exporting to
the CMEA countries decreased. Recession ended in 1992,
which was the first year of production growth. Since 1993
production has been increasing by 10 per cent per year.
Enterprises began to adapt to the new, market environ-
ment. The expanding private sector constituted a consider-
able part of the economy. Initially, increasing exports to the
European Union (especially to Germany) boosted demand.
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Then, the domestic demand recovered and the production
growth was fuelled mainly by domestic absorption. It is
important to note that the structure of production growth
in manufacturing has changed in last two years. Figures 3
and 4 indicate that the dynamics of the consumer goods
sectors declined, while the production growth in the
investment branches increased relative to average growth
in manufacturing. Thus, the process of restructuring seems
to positively affect investment demand, which is fairly obvi-
ous in transforming economy.
Lipowski (1998), discussing changes in structure of the
manufacturing sector in 19901995, observes that pre-
transformation manufacturing production in Poland was
extremely material intensive and its competitiveness was
relatively low. It follows that the production of raw materi-
als and low-processed goods should gradually fall with the
progress in restructuring and adopting new technologies.
There is only one division producing low-processed goods
in the sample under investigation, namely Manufacture of
Fabricated Metal Products. This is one of the fastest grow-
ing branches so the data do not seem to confirm this sup-
position.
2.2. Employment Dynamics and Average    
Salaries
In 199094 average employment in industry was con-
tinuously falling. The exact estimation of employment
dynamics is impossible because of changes in industrial
classification but it is justifiable to use the available figures
for rough comparison. In 1990 average employment in
industry (KGN classification) was 4,620,000 while in 1994
it dropped to 3,641,000 (NACE classification). Enterprises
in the pre-transformation period were plagued by a sub-
stantial overmanning. The process of adjustment was
painful and  labor hoarding remained a considerable prob-
lem even after four years of reforms. Results from a broad
survey of Polish enterprises indicate that the issue of over-
manning was certainly unsolved in 1993 [Belka et al.,
1995]. The last year of employment decline was 1994, fol-
lowed by growth in 1995.
The dynamics of employment showed a declining
trend both in the consumer goods and in the investment
goods production between 1993 and 1996. It is clear from
the data on employment that the average employment
growth differs across branches. The most noticeable out-
lier is very high employment growth in the clothing indus-
try in 1993 but growth in the food industry is also sub-
stantial. As was already shown, the food industry did not
experience production decline at the beginning of the
transformation. A decrease in the production of clothing
was lower than the manufacturing average. These obser-
vations seem to confirm the supposition that the con-
sumer goods sector was less influenced by the stabilization
shock and demand contraction. The pressure on restruc-
turing might have been lower than in other branches.
However, the food industry experienced decline in
employment in 1994, indicating that employment was
excessive. 
A situation in the investment goods sector was different
although one branch had also experienced high employ-
ment growth already in 1993 (Production of Fabricated
Metal Products). In other branches employment was signif-
icantly reduced at the beginning of the transformation. Two
branches were capable to increase employment in 199495
(Fabricated Metal Products and Electrical Machinery and
Apparatus). The Production of Radio, Television and Com-
munication Equipment experienced persistent decline in
employment. These results confirm that the pressure on
restructuring was stronger in the investment goods sector
due to demand contraction. The situation of the consumer
goods sector was better at the initial stage of transformation
since demand for these products was repressed in the
planned economy and the demand contraction due to trans-
formation was less severe. To fully assess the employment
decisions of the firms, we also analyzed the salaries in
branches under investigation relative to the manufacturing
average.
Salaries in the food and clothing industry were generally
below the manufacturing average (although close to average
and, in 1992, higher in the food industry). Moreover, salaries
in the clothing industry are declining relative to the average
in manufacturing. Two branches in the investment sector
had considerably higher salaries than the manufacturing
average  Production of Electrical Machinery and Apparatus
and Production of Radio, Television and Communication
Equipment. These branches (especially Production of Radio,
Television and Communication Equipment) are certainly the
most human-capital intensive in the sample. The positive
difference between salaries in these branches and the man-
ufacturing average may be explained by the fact that highly
skilled labor is employed in both industries. On the other
hand, severe and persistent employment decline in Produc-
tion of Radio, Television and Communication Equipment
may suggest that the average salaries paid in this branch is
too high, making the manufacturing of high-tech products
too expensive.
2.3. Enterprise Profitability and Liquidity
In the previous two sections it was shown that the
enterprises restructuring in manufacturing, combined with
demand contraction, resulted in a substantial decline in pro-
duction and in employment. In this section an influence of
these factors on profitability will be investigated. Figures 5
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and 6 compare gross profitability of branches with gross
profitability in manufacturing. Gross profitability in the con-
sumer goods sector was higher than the manufacturing
average in the 199293 period and lower afterwards. The
profitability of the food industry is gradually increasing after
a decline in 1993. The clothing sector obtained the highest
profitability in 199394.
In the investment goods sector gross profitability was
continuously above the manufacturing average in two
branches: Production of Fabricated Metal Products and Pro-
duction of Electrical Machinery and Apparatus. In Produc-
tion of Machinery and Equipment, profitability became pos-
itive in 1994 and higher than the manufacturing average in
1996. Production of Radio, Television and Communication
Equipment generated losses and became profitable only in
1996. These facts confirm our hypothesis that the situation
of the consumer goods sector was relatively better at the
beginning of the transformation process. The profitability of
the investment goods sector gradually improved, although in
some branches it was very high from the beginning of the
period.
In further investigations of the financial situation in
manufacturing we analyze liquidity in enterprises. Quick
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ratio indicators largely differed between the consumer
goods and the investment goods sectors. The figures do
not reveal any clear patterns in changes in liquidity or in
differences between the groups. Liquidity remained
roughly constant in the consumer goods sector and was
slightly increasing in the investment goods sector. Within
the consumer goods sector, clothing had an above-aver-
age indicator with 0.8, while food production showed a
below-average liquidity with 0.50.6 cent between 1993
and 1996. Within the investment goods sector, it was only
machinery and equipment production, plus the telecom-
munications equipment production that had a below-
average quick ratio, with 0.60.7, and 0.450.55, respec-
tively. The quick ratio of fabricated metal products, man-
ufacturing and electrical machinery amounted to 1.01.2,
0.91.0 and 0.650.8, respectively.
The differences between branches seem to be caused
by persistent branch-specific effects, that is, differences in
the normal liquidity level for branches. Figures 9 and 10
present investment to revenue ratios for the branches
under investigation. Investment patterns reflect the cur-
rent situation of the enterprises but also expectations con-
cerning future demand for products and profitability of the
industries.
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Investment outlays (as percentage of revenue) were
increasing in the Manufacturing of Food Products and
remained constant (and higher than manufacturing average)
in Clothing Production. In the investment goods sector the
investment to revenue ratio decreased in almost all branch-
es except Production of Machinery and Equipment. The
reduction of investments may indicate a gradual decline in
the initial growth potential in these industries.
The main conclusion from our investigation is that the
branches producing consumer goods faced less demand
contraction at the beginning of the transformation process
than the industries producing investment goods. The less
severe initial conditions were reflected in lower output and
employment decline, as well as in higher profitability in the
consumer goods sector. After the initial restructuring, the
situation in the investment goods sector improved and the
economic performance of these branches became better
than the manufacturing average. However, the other finan-
cial indicator  liquidity  does not follow this pattern and
seems to be determined by branch-specific characteristics.
Investment outlays recently decreased in the investment
goods sector, which may indicate a decline in the growth
potential of these industries.
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The purpose of this section is to paint a fairly detailed
picture of the various types of ownership transformation
processes which all the firms in our sample have undergone,
and then to examine the results of restructuring in order to
determine whether there is any relationship between such
restructuring processes on the one hand, and the nature of
the ownership transformation process or the branch in
which the enterprise operates on the other.
3.1. Description of the Sample
The firms are divided into two broad groups: those pro-
ducing consumer goods and those producing investment-
type goods (one firm producing household appliances has
been included in the group of investment goods producers
due to the nature of the production technology). Our sample
of 24 firms includes 11 enterprises producing mostly invest-
ment goods and 13 consumer goods producers. Companies
in the consumer group represent the food and clothing indus-
tries. Enterprises in the investment group are more diversi-
fied but most of them may be classified in the machinery
industry. The sample contains only six firms that have not
been fully privatized: three state treasury companies  that is,
companies which have undergone so-called commercializa-
tion but have not advanced beyond wholly state-owned sta-
tus  and three companies participating in the National
Investment Fund (NIF) program. One firm in the sample is
also treated as a privatized firm although it is still majority
owned by the state treasury and its strategic investor is also
a state agency. The vast majority of privatized firms in our
sample were privatized on the basis of conventional methods
(for example, initial public offerings and trade sales) referred
to in Poland as capital or indirect privatization; only three
were privatized on the basis of employee leasing (the most
popular of so-called liquidation or direct privatization). One
very interesting and exceptional case is that of an employee-
owned company which was created by being separated from
a company which had earlier been commercialized and then
sold to a foreign investor. All the enterprises in the sample but
three (employee-owned) underwent commercialization. The
timing of the commercialization does not seem to be corre-
lated with the size of firm and does not differ significantly
across the two industrial groups. 
3.2. Initiators of, and Motives for,
Transformation
In most cases, when we asked respondents who had ini-
tiated the ownership transformation process, they named the
director (sometimes jointly with the employees council; in
one case, a third party  the Solidarity trade union  was
mentioned). In three cases  a state treasury company, an
NIF company, and a privatized firm with a large foreign share-
holder  the initiator named was an outsider (the ministry).
Another state treasury company named the state treasury,
insiders and a bank as initiators. The founding organ (voivode)
was named in one case as an initiator. Four companies pro-
vided no answer.
As regards the motives, seven firms provided no answer.
The firm which had still not been privatized five years after
commercialization stated that it had chosen commercializa-
tion in order to avoid the dywidenda tax [20]. Motives of
commercialization were named in five other cases. The
most popular motive was making privatization possible
(commercialization being the necessary first step of capital
privatization). This motive was named by four companies
(all privatized), although one of them also mentioned the
desire to avoid the popiwek tax [21]. One company stated
that its motive for commercialization was the ability to cre-
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ate a holding company and carry out other organizational
changes and improve decision-making process.
The most popular motive of privatization named by the
companies was the desire to acquire investment capital.
There were two variants of this motive. One was the acqui-
sition of a strategic investor who would provide these funds
(named by three firms, all owned by strategic investors 
two foreign and one a Polish individual). In the other variant
the strategic investor does not appear as a source of funds.
This variant was named by five firms (Interestingly, all of
them but one have strategic investors).
3.3. Ownership Structure Past and 
Present; Employment Restructuring
All firms in the sample were still 100 per cent state-owned
as of the end of 1990. By definition, all state treasury compa-
nies continue to be 100 per cent state-owned. The NIF firms
in the sample still have a relatively uniform ownership struc-
ture: in each of them 33 per cent of the shares belong to the
leading fund and 27 per cent to the other 14 funds. As two of
the firms are food processing firms, both employees and
farmers supplying the firms are entitle to free shares, giving
these two groups a combined share of close to 30 per cent in
both firms; the remaining approximate 10 per cent is held by
the state treasury. In the other firm, employees hold 15 per
cent, and the state treasury holds 25 per cent.
If we turn to other firms acquired by Polish owners but
not employees we note, first, that only in one case out of
seven was the purchaser an individual. In all cases (four) in
which there is a strategic investor (holding 30 per cent or
more of the shares), it is an institutional investor  in two
cases a financial investor (bank) and in two cases a non-finan-
cial investor (a holding company and a state-owned agency). 
A question often posed in discussions about the role of
privileges for employees in the privatization process con-
cerns the shares which employees acquired at preferential
prices or even for free (in the case of indirect privatization,
the employees are given such privileges): Have they simply
sold them to make a quick and very large profit, or do they
appear to be genuinely interested in being co-owners of the
firms in which they work? In cases of publicly traded compa-
nies, it is often very difficult, if not impossible, to determine
how many shares are held by employees (five companies
were unable to provide data on what percentage of shares
was held by employees  although one of these was not pub-
licly traded), but the information provided by our respon-
dents concerning the number of shares held by employees in
firms privatized by so-called indirect methods (in which
employees acquired shares at half their face value or for free)
indicates that employee shares in those companies were
between 1 and 7.5 per cent in 1996. Given the fact that in all
these companies 20 per cent of the shares were originally
reserved for the employees on preferential conditions, it
seems that employees have in fact generally been quick to
dispose of their shares, often realizing impressive gains.
Another important issue is the state share maintained in
companies privatized by indirect methods. This share was
generally low in the companies in our sample. In seven com-
panies the state treasury held no shares whatsoever; in the
others, the state shares  as of 1996  ranged from 0.2 per
cent to a majority share. All three of the firms in the sample
privatized by employee leasing have undergone further own-
ership transformation, becoming non-leasing firms before
the expiration of the leasing contract. This is indicative of a
trend occurring throughout the economy with respect to
better-performing companies privatized by this method. In
one case, all shares were sold to a foreign owner; in two
other cases, additional capital has been obtained by means of
quotation on the Warsaw Stock Exchange.
Some of the most important questions surrounding the
influence of ownership transformation processes on
employment are: Does privatization (commercialization)
change the pace of employment reduction? Or does
employment reduction follow industrial patterns irrespec-
tive of ownership form? Or does it vary from case to case,
depending solely on the financial health of the firm? Does
the type of ownership matter (for example, are firms owned
by strategic investors more willing to cut employment than
firms owned by employees)?
Before examining the evidence from our sample, it is
worth noting two things. First, in the state and former state
sector in 1990 and 1991  in the depths of the transforma-
tion recession (which ended in 1992)  the pace of employ-
ment reduction was much slower than the rate of produc-
tion decline; however, this pace continued relatively unabat-
ed (or even accelerated) into the period of recovery. Sec-
ond, a belief very widely held in Poland is that privatization
is followed by accelerated employment reduction, despite
the fact that several empirical studies have concluded that
this is not the case and that employment reduction general-
ly begins well before privatization. Does the evidence from
our sample shed any light on these problems?
First, we must note the unfortunate number of compa-
nies (seven) in our sample for which we have no data on
employment or for which the data are only from a single
year, not allowing for an analysis of employment dynamics.
In addition, there are six companies for which there are no
data from recession years and seven firms for which there
are no data before privatization/commercialization.
Having noted that, we can state what we found in those
companies for which we have data. We might start with the
good news: three enterprises had no significant drops in
employment during the period for which we have data. Turn-
ing to the worst news, the most drastic drops in employment
during the entire period of the 1990s were found in four
companies. In the first two cases, the biggest drops occurred
after privatization, whereas in the second two (commer-
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cialized, EO), they occurred before privatization. Looking at
the best and worst cases, there is certainly no obvious cor-
relation between type of ownership and employment policy.
As for less extreme cases: for three companies (an NIF com-
pany, a publicly-traded company, and a state treasury com-
pany), the largest drops occurred in the same period (cov-
ering more than one year) as privatization, and we cannot
determine whether this was before or after actual privatiza-
tion. Finally, in four companies (an NIF company, a publicly-
traded company, a foreign-owned company, and a company
owned by a Polish strategic investor) the most dramatic
drops occurred after privatization.
Three companies experienced their most dramatic drops
in employment during the recession. Four companies most
dramatic drops occurred after the recession. It is interesting
to note that we observe companies from the same branch
(clothing) and ownership groups (NIF , publicly traded) in both
categories (employment drops before and after recession). 
Clearly, the evidence here is very mixed. The size of the
sample and the gaps in the data suggest the utmost caution,
but there is certainly no evidence in our data that ownership
transformation is related in any deterministic way to
employment policy: we can find companies with identical
ownership forms and very different employment patterns.
There may be a certain branch relationship: the three com-
panies that managed to avoid large employment drops were
all food producers and the four companies which shrank
drastically were all machine producers.
3.4. Labor Costs and Changes in Pay
and Other Motivation Systems
Following the analysis of employment, the next task is to
analyze the extent to which employment rationalization
affected  labor costs and the relationship between labor cost
growth and ownership transformation vs. other factors (for
example, branch) dealt with above in the employment analy-
sis. Once again, we must begin by noting the fairly large gaps
in the data. No data at all were received from seven firms.
No data on recession years were received from eight firms,
and five firms failed to provide data from the period preced-
ing privatization (Additionally, data for five firms prior to pri-
vatization is lacking because they were privatized so early). 
The first observation seems to be that in the recession
years firms tended to keep the growth of their wage bills well
below the growth in the producer price index. Seven firms
showed an increasing trend following privatization; two firms
did not. In the end, six firms (from every ownership category
except publicly traded firms) had wage bill growth lower than
the growth in the producer price index during the entire peri-
od for which they provided data. Two of these six provided
no data on employment, but the other four showed the
biggest employment reductions in the sample.
As a sort of check on the comparison between employ-
ment data and wage bill data, we gathered information on
average monthly wages in the firms (Here too there are large
gaps in the data). An interesting contrast to the data on the
total wage bills is noted here: while total wage bill growth
tended to stay well below producer price index growth dur-
ing 1991 and 1992 (as the recession was coming to an end),
average monthly wage growth in this period exceeded con-
sumer price index growth with only one exception. In the
first year of growth, wage growth in the foreign-owned firms
was  with one exception  above consumer price index
growth, while in the other firms the situation varied. In the
following years, characterized by steady growth, wage
growth has been consistently above consumer price index
growth. However, the large gaps in the data suggest great
caution in the interpretation of these results.
Changes in pay systems, especially if they are designed
to increase the motivation of employees, often constitute an
important aspect of organizational change. Close links
between performance and pay are often considered espe-
cially important for management. We therefore sought
information on changes in pay systems, with an emphasis on
motivational elements  both for managerial and non-man-
agerial employees. It should be noted, however, that in
some cases it is difficult to determine the nature of the
motivational element of pay for non-managerial employees.
In many cases a bonus is referred to, but in some cases this
is a bonus linked to the financial performance of the com-
pany and thus having the incentive effects of a profit-sharing
arrangement; in other cases, it is simply a fixed bonus which
is withheld in cases of absenteeism or discipline problems
and therefore has a more disciplinary than motivational
character. We are not always certain to which type of bonus
a given correspondent was referring.
Four firms (one NIF firm, one employee-owned firm,
and two with Polish strategic investors) reported no
changes in their pay systems. Eight companies, from all
ownership types and branches, reported using a bonus sys-
tem for their employees. However, the direction of devel-
opments with respect to bonuses is not the same through-
out the sample. While three firms noted that the weight of
the performance-related component of pay had increased,
and one reported a planned increase, three firms (all for-
eign-owned) reported a decrease in the weight of the per-
formance-related component of pay.
The principles determining base pay also differ quite
widely. For example, while six firms reported using fixed
daily or monthly rates (and two of them had switched from
piece rates), four reported the use of piece rate wage sys-
tems for production workers, and two others reported the
use of both (although one of these is gradually shifting from
a piece rate system to daily rates). Here too there appear to
be no patterns with respect to ownership type, although
there seems to be a shift away from piece rate systems in
companies producing investment goods.
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3.5. Training and Organizational Changes
Firms generally provided little information about training
activity. Aside from health and safety training, which is
required by the law, our evidence seems to indicate that
Polish firms generally tend to underestimate the importance
of investment in human capital regardless of their ownership
status, unless they are owned by foreign investors or have
introduced an ISO certification program.
In the area of organizational changes, three firms report-
ed that no changes worth mentioning had occurred. Five
companies reported that the only change had been the cre-
ation of one department or division; in two cases, this was a
marketing department (Creation of a marketing department
was one of a number of changes made in five other firms).
The development of two or more new departments and
divisions was mentioned by four firms.
Spatial expansion of various kinds was reported by six
companies. In contrast, spatial concentration was men-
tioned by six companies. Plant closings occurred in two
firms, and one plant was sold by another. Apartments, holi-
day camps, and other employee service facilities were sold
by four firms, and other real estate (buildings and land) by
three others. Strictly organizational measures took place in
five firms. Employment restructuring was mentioned by two
firms. A holding structure was created by another. An
employee-owned firm introduced cost and profit centers,
meaning that the firms six plants (corresponding to six
product groups) are highly autonomous, with each having its
own design, sales, marketing, quality control, personnel
management, and accounting. Divisions were reorganized
by two firms. 
3.6. Company Presidents, Directors and   
Supervisory Board Members: Where 
Do They Come From, Who Chooses 
Them and How Much Are They Paid?
Managerial continuity is observed very generally in our
sample and seems to be independent of the mode of own-
ership transformation. Our data indicate that there have only
been eight cases of management shake-ups in the 1990s. Six
of these were cases with strategic investors (five of them for-
eign, the other a case in which the owner took over the posi-
tion of president shortly before our research was conduct-
ed), and two employee-owned companies. Generally, how-
ever, todays managers were also the managers of yester-
days state-owned enterprises under socialism.
Asked who determines membership of the board of
directors and the supervisory board, most respondents sim-
ply answered in accordance with the commercial code that
the membership of the board of directors is determined by
the supervisory board and that of the supervisory board by
the shareholders assembly. Only a few companies went into
more detail about the politics behind these personnel deci-
sions, providing some insights into how these decisions are
made in reality, behind the scenes. A number of responses
indicate that while the president is chosen by the superviso-
ry board, the other members of the board of directors are
usually hand-picked by the president.
Who sets the remuneration for members of the two
boards? Eleven firms reported that managements pay is
determined by the supervisory board. Seven firms reported
that supervisory board members pay is determined by the
shareholders. One NIF firm said that the NIF determines
pay for both boards, and two firms with strategic owners
(one domestic, one foreign) said that the owner determines
pay for both boards. In two foreign-owned companies, rep-
resentatives of the owners on the supervisory boards are
not paid. A respondent from one publicly-traded firm said
that management base pay was set not by the supervisory
board but by the shareholders assembly, and that the super-
visory board set the bonuses for management. Finally, eight
firms provided no information on this subject.
Possibly the two most interesting observations concerning
supervisory board membership in our sample are that the
boards of firms owned by strategic investors tend to include
employee representatives and that there is a strong outsider
presence on employee-owned firms (in at least two cases
representing a source of technology transfer). Thus, it seems
that insider-dominated firms often appreciate the contribu-
tions that outsiders can make, and that outsider-owners often
continue to find value in the employee representation which
originated before they acquired their firms. In firms owned by
Polish strategic investors, representatives of the owners dom-
inate the supervisory boards but are not the exclusive mem-
bers. By contrast, three foreign-owned companies boards
consist exclusively of representatives of the strategic investors
(The same situation exists in the former employee-owned
company which is now foreign-owned). The boards of the
other four all include employee representatives, and the
board of one in which the state treasury still maintains a sig-
nificant stake also has one member representing the state
treasury.
There is wide variation in the frequency of supervisory
board meetings. The frequency named by the largest number
of firms (11) is once a month. In five firms, the board meets
every two to three months; in four (all foreign-owned), every
three months, in two, two to three times a year, and in one
(foreign-owned), once a year. Only in one foreign-owned
company do meetings occur once a month; in all other for-
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eign companies, they occur every three months at best.
Apart from this, however, we do not observe any correlation
between the type of ownership and the frequency of board
meetings. Even more interestingly, frequency does not
appear to be very strongly linked to whether or not the
board in a firm is involved in strategy formulation, as one of
the three firms meeting less than once every quarter is
described as a strategy-maker, and two of the four boards
meeting once every quarter are strategy-makers (although
the board that meets only once a year is also the only one
described as a passive organ). There does, however, appear
to be a strong connection between frequency and whether a
board is described by the respondents as an active one. Of
the eleven boards described as active, only two have boards
which meet less than once a month.
In evaluating the role of supervisory board in Polish com-
panies, one must first be careful to distinguish between the
role of this organ in the European two-tier management sys-
tem and the role of the board of directors in the Anglo-Saxon
system, where corporate executives sit beside outside mon-
itors on one body. Generally speaking, the role of the super-
visory board in the European system is to monitor the per-
formance of management  and, when the need arises, to dis-
cipline or even replace management  and not to manage the
company. Of course, in practice, the actual range of activities
in which the supervisory board engages may span a wide
spectrum, depending on numerous factors, of which the
ownership structure is undoubtedly one. But it would cer-
tainly be a misunderstanding to judge a supervisory board to
be unduly passive if it evaluates plans developed by the board
of directors without, for example, developing alternative
plans of its own. The need for caution is further underlined by
the highly subjective, and therefore often vague, nature of the
respondents evaluations of the supervisory boards role in
the decision-making process. 
Respondents tended not to express negative opinions
concerning the role of the supervisory board. There were
only two cases of unambiguously negative evaluations of
the supervisory boards performance. In one firm owned
by a Polish individual investor, the supervisory board
(which meets every two to three months) was described
as playing no role in the decision-making process (Accord-
ingly, the owner was named as the only strategy maker in
this firm). Furthermore, we asked respondents whether
the supervisory board was a passive or active organ, and
in only one case  that of a foreign-owned firm  was pas-
sivity indicated (This was also a firm in which the board of
directors alone was named as the strategy-maker and the
one in which the board meets least frequently  only once
a year). Turning to more indirect measures, we asked
whether the board was rather a consultative or a deci-
sion-making organ. These were not necessarily seen as
mutually exclusive categories, as two boards (in an NIF
company and an employee-owned company) were
described as both. 
Just as a decision-making character and a consultative
character are not mutually exclusive, neither is an active
role necessarily associated with a decision-making, or
strategic, role. While boards of a decision-making or strate-
gic character are described as active, the reverse is not nec-
essarily the case. Most descriptions (16) of the supervisory
boards activities listed those which are statutorily required:
the boards of four companies of diverse ownership types,
including two foreign-owned companies, were described as
consultative organs, those of five companies as monitors
and advisors to the board of directors, and those of seven
were described as both (the latter two groups were also of
diverse ownership structures, although neither included
foreign-owned companies). While seven boards described
as active were described as having monitoring and advisory
roles, only four were described as decision-making organs,
and two were described as strategy-makers. 
We asked the respondents to identify the most active
members of the supervisory board. Although we received
very few answers (five), they indicate an interesting diversity.
In four companies (two foreign-owned, one NIF , and one in
which the state and a state agency hold the majority of
shares) whose supervisory boards include employee repre-
sentatives, the representatives of the owners were said to be
the most active, whereas in one company owned by a Polish
individual, the employee representative was the most active.
3.7. Who Determines the Company    
Strategy?
Respondents were asked who formulates the company
strategy. Four companies (all foreign-owned) provided no
answer. The answers received indicate that the board of
directors usually plays the crucial role here, with the super-
visory board usually taking the back seat. Interestingly, there
seems to be no correlation between the type of ownership
and the location of strategy-making responsibility, as all own-
ership types are represented both in the group of firms in
which supervisory boards play a small role in strategy-mak-
ing and in the group where they play a greater role (Neither
is there a correlation between branch and the location of
strategy-making responsibility). Another interesting observa-
tion is that owners  even in cases of strategic investors 
seldom play a direct role (although the lack of answers from
four foreign-owned companies may distort this picture). Six
companies indicated that the board of directors alone deter-
mined strategy. Two (an NIF company and one with a Polish
institutional strategic investor) indicated that the owner and
the board of directors did so together, and one owned by a
Polish individual investor indicated that the owner alone
determined company strategy. Four indicated that strategy
was formulated by the board of directors, with review and
advice by the supervisory board. Six respondents stated that
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their firms strategies were worked out by the board of
directors and supervisory board together. Finally, in one for-
eign-owned firm, strategy is developed by the owners rep-
resentatives on the supervisory board.
3.8. Views on Corporate Governance
and How to Improve it
The response rate to this question was quite good; only
one firm failed to provide an answer. Nineteen companies
respondents said that there were no problems in relations
between the two boards. Conflicts between the boards
were only mentioned in two cases. In an NIF company, dis-
agreement arose because the supervisory board did not
agree to a share issue intended by the board of directors to
increase investment funds, due to the fact that the NIF wants
to maximize the price of the companys shares. In a state
treasury company, the respondent state that the first super-
visory board had tried to force a certain strategy on man-
agement, but that the second supervisory board works bet-
ter with management and problems have been eliminated. 
In keeping with the generally positive evaluation of rela-
tions between the two boards, a large number (11) of
respondents saw the corporate governance structure seen
as adequate and did not mention any changes they believed
would be desirable. Four firms did not indicate whether
they saw the governance structure as adequate or in need
of change.
Only five respondents commented on the role of trade
unions in corporate governance. One of these did so only
indirectly by saying that there were no bodies beside the
two boards which had any influence on governance. Anoth-
er (from a foreign-owned firm which experienced drastic
employment reduction) said that trade unions in the firm
had dissolved themselves in 1995. Two others (in an
employee-owned company and one in which the state trea-
sury and a state agency have controlling shares) said that
trade union representatives were pragmatic and did not
cause any conflicts with management. Only in one company
(an NIF company) did the respondent remark that the role
of trade unions was excessive and should be reduced.
Nine respondents either stated what they thought
should be done to improve corporate governance or
reported what was being done to improve it. One managing
director of an NIF firm said that he believed the company
would be better off without a supervisory board. As men-
tioned above, in another NIF firm, the respondent felt that
the role of trade unions should be decreased. One state
treasury company representative said that in his opinion
supervisory board members should have capital links to the
company to increase motivation. The managing director of
a publicly traded company said that he was considering
adding a new member to the board of directors (which had
three members at the time of the interview). The director
of an employee-owned company said that the decision-
making process would be improved if share ownership
were concentrated, with a controlling package of shares in
the hands of a small group of people; he also said he would
like to expand the board of directors from 2 to 3 persons.
The respondent from the company owned by a Polish indi-
vidual investor said that the company needs a new, intelli-
gent investor with a different development vision than the
current owners. One employee-owned company repre-
sentative said that control over the firms wholly-owned
subsidiaries is to be tightened. Another respondent from an
employee-owned company said that there should be an
advisory body for production/quality control matters and
market research. Finally, a representative of a foreign-
owned company reported that corporate governance was
to be improved by the introduction of computerized infor-
mation systems, which should improve information flow.
3.9. Respondents Overall Evaluation of 
Restructuring and Challenges for the 
Future
We asked the respondents to evaluate restructuring
efforts in their companies to date by identifying the most
important successes in restructuring, the deciding factors in
those successes, and the problems that had not yet been
addressed in the restructuring process. Eight firms provided
no answer to this group of questions. In general, producers
of consumer goods stressed market-oriented and produc-
tion measures, while investment goods producers were
more strongly represented in the groups emphasizing orga-
nizational and cost-reducing measures, as well as those
emphasizing ownership transformation itself. As for restruc-
turing problems not yet dealt with, two noteworthy obser-
vations are that companies are generally satisfied with their
market-oriented measures of the past and seem to want to
concentrate on production issues  especially investment 
in the future and that employee-owned companies are
interested in further ownership transformation.
We asked the respondents to identify the biggest chal-
lenges facing their firms in the future. Six firms provided no
answer to this question. Three respondents saw their
biggest challenges in the area of cost reduction, seven men-
tioned market-oriented measures, six mentioned produc-
tion-oriented measures, and four mentioned ownership
transformation itself (six provided no answer). It is interest-
ing to note that while some employee-owned companies
indicated their desire for further ownership transformation,
none indicated that this area would be the most important
challenge in the future.
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The research presented in this section is concentrated
on the following issues:
(1) Changes in the product range accomplished over the
last six years, including main and secondary items manufac-
tured by the enterprise. (2) Changes in the market position
of enterprises measured by the share in the market.
(3) Industrial adjustments of enterprises to customers
expectations and market requirements involved with the
shortening of life cycles of products. (4) Methods of mod-
ernization of production. (5) Transformation of production
processes, including changes to production cycles, produc-
tivity, production capacities in enterprises and their utiliza-
tion over the last six years. (6) Changes in the composition
of suppliers. 
4.1. Production
Changes in the product range
Changes in the basic and secondary product range are of
very different nature and scope depending on the owner-
ship form of the analyzed firm and the branch in which it
operates. Very substantial changes were found in nine
enterprises, of which four were privatized firms with a
majority stake held by foreign owners, four were privatized
firms with a majority stake held by Polish owners, and one
is an NIF company. Small changes in the product range were
introduced in five enterprises, of which three were priva-
tized firms with a majority stake held by Polish owners, one
was a privatized firm with a majority stake held by foreign
owners and one was an NIF company. No changes were
introduced to the basic product range in nine of the ana-
lyzed enterprises, of which two were NIF companies, one
was a state treasury company, two were privatized firms
with a majority stake held by foreign owners and four were
privatized firms with a majority stake held by Polish owners.
Privatized enterprises having introduced no changes to their
product range explained that in terms of continued require-
ment for items manufactured by them the problem was not
the product range but product quality. Consequently, these
enterprises, following their privatization, concentrated on
modernization and improvement of product quality. The
changes in the structure of production in surveyed enter-
prises were aimed at: launching new products, limiting the
output or discontinuing the production of previously pro-
duced items, and increasing the production of supplemen-
tary items.
The share of newly-launched products in surveyed
enterprises can be estimated at 10 to 45 per cent in most
firms. The furthest-reaching changes were found in two
firms having replaced as much as 90 per cent of the assort-
ment of production (interestingly, both these enterprises
are manufacturers of capital goods). The data concerning
the share of new products in total production are estimates,
as such records are rarely kept by companies themselves. In
many cases the problem lies in classifying a product as nov-
elty. It is justified when new products require introduction
of completely new technologies, different from those
applied so far. The launching of new products was accom-
panied by the withdrawal of unprofitable and hardly mar-
ketable items from the market. Most enterprises which
have not implemented any major changes to their product
range embarked on product quality improvements (these
issues are to be discussed later on). 
Changes in the market position of enterprises
It is difficult to evaluate the market position of enter-
prises due to lack of complete data concerning market
shares of an enterprise and its major competitors at two
points in time, that is, in 1990 and 1996. Five enterprises
failed to provide any data on their and their main competi-
tors market positions in 1990 and 1996, and four respon-
dents were unable to specify market shares in 1990. The
analyzed sample included three firms currently holding
monopolistic position on the market  manufacturers of
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capital goods, and one food-processing firm having lost its
monopolistic position to foreign competitors. 
The market position of the remaining surveyed enter-
prises for which data were available is considerably diversi-
fied. Some firms formerly held monopolistic positions and
have lost them. We observe other firms with market shares
as low as 0.7 per cent. Four firms dominate in their sectors
over their main competitors in terms of the value of sales,
although their market shares do not exceed 30 per cent.
These are sectors of the engineering industry, in which the
pattern of competition changed over the last six years due to
the entry of foreign firms either with their finished products
(imports) or through capital investment in Polish enterprises.
Two surveyed firms (both of them NIF companies) com-
pete on local markets, with their shares in the value of sales
reaching 50 per cent and showing sustained growth over the
past six years. For the near future, these enterprises do not
plan to undertake actions towards a substantial expansion
and are still going to consolidate their position exclusively on
the local market. Their long-term strategy assumes pene-
tration of markets of the former Soviet Union. 
Industrial adjustments of enterprises
to customers expectations
Industrial adjustments in the surveyed enterprises were
aimed at: launching new products and new assortments of
goods, introducing new products and new assortments of
goods to new market segments, modification of products
manufactured so far involving their modernization, improve-
ment of quality, users features, appearance, and so on. In
addition, firms targeted the expansion of production capac-
ities  construction of new production plants, purchase of
technology lines, purchase of state-of-the-art machinery and
equipment. In only 5 out of 23 surveyed enterprises were
no new products introduced to the market. In the remain-
ing firms the changes were the following: in 10 enterprises
the scale of changes was very large  new production was
started and products were introduced to the market, in
three enterprises the scale of changes in the portfolio of
goods was limited  the so-far assortments were supple-
mented with new items, and in two enterprises product
changes were manifested by an improved appearance of
products or packaging. 
The already mentioned candy sector provides a good
example here. These firms managed to enhance their pro-
ductivity and to increase their capacities in view of a soaring
market demand for their products. Polish manufacturers
managed to maintain or even strengthen their position on
this difficult, highly competitive and open to foreign compa-
nies market. Undoubtedly, the standing of privatized firms
with a majority stake held by foreign owners is the best.
Small firms operating on this market chose a strategy of
copying the already established, well-selling products. Large
firms in this sector stepped up their exports to the difficult
markets of the European Union, the US and the former
Soviet Union. Small firms enjoyed the booming market and
based their exports on cross-border deals.
Engineering industry enterprises, manufacturing capital
goods and so-called consumer durables did not restrict their
industrial restructuring to the widening of the product range
by the introduction of new products based on state-of-the-
art technologies, adding new functions to their products,
modification of technical and quality specifications, as well as
modernization of the already manufactured products. Mar-
ket changes in this sector have also resulted in undertaking
new follow-up services, the extension and improvement of
the maintenance network and offering financial assistance to
customers. Foreign-owned firms gained competitive advan-
tages thanks to making special offers to customers, that is
offering products closely following customers specifications
and satisfying particular requirements. 
Market adjustments in surveyed enterprises also cov-
ered such activities as: improvement of product quality,
improved appearance of goods and packaging, new patterns
(clothing sector), implementation of ISO 9000 quality stan-
dards, extension of products storage life (foodstuffs). They
also aimed at the introduction of new standards in the field
of production preparation, product adjustments to individ-
ual tastes of customers, filling in market niches, the imple-
mentation of new production technologies, outward pro-
cessing traffic, the creation of new enterprise structures
aimed at vertical and horizontal integration, reconciling
interests of suppliers and producers in achieving better qual-
ity of final goods, and channeling production to higher mar-
ket segments (better product quality, higher price, more
well-off but at the same time more demanding customer).
Methods of production modernization
The main ways of modernizing production by the sur-
veyed enterprises included:
 working out their own research and development (R&D)
base  in 19 surveyed enterprises,
 know-how transfer  in 17 surveyed enterprises, 
 studies provided by research institutes or specialized R&D
units operating in some sectors  in 5 surveyed enterpris-
es,
 cooperation with suppliers in the field of improving the
quality of final goods, in two surveyed enterprises.
Undoubtedly, the own research and development (R&D)
base is of crucial significance in the product modernization
in surveyed enterprises. In recent years, many firms operat-
ing on highly competitive markets have established their
R&D departments, scientific laboratories and design depart-
ments. Fierce rivalry results in innovativeness, while catch-
ing up with technological and organizational progress
CASE Reports No. 1835
Privatization and Company Restructuring in Poland
requires regular implementation of new solutions not only
in production, but also in company management processes.
In some enterprises the strengthening of R&D departments
brought about original patents. Know-how transfer takes
various forms, including new technologies of production,
new products, state-of-the-art organization and manage-
ment techniques. This was the case in both the food sector
and the engineering industry. 
In the clothing sector, more significance is attached to
the experience gained by Polish enterprises within the
framework of the so-called outward processing traffic
(OPT). This form of cooperation has been developed by
some firms for more than ten years. Two surveyed enter-
prises producing finished clothing employ foreign designers.
These firms argue it is a very efficient way of improving the
quality of products, expanding the product range and work-
ing out features distinguishing the firm among its market
competitors.
Transformations in production processes
of enterprises
The modernization of production, introduction of new
products and changes in the assortment structure find
their consequences in changes to  labor productivity and
to the life cycle of products. In some of the surveyed
enterprises (five firms) no relevant information was
obtained, while in three firms it was stated that productiv-
ity changes and life cycle duration had not been moni-
tored. In one enterprise the life cycle was extended by
some 30 per cent, and  labor productivity declined, as the
output had been reduced. Fourteen surveyed enterprises
saw various changes to  labor productivity and to the pro-
duction cycle. 
Labor productivity soared (in one enterprise it went up
ten-fold). The level of capacity utilization increased, also a
consequence of the sale of non-productive fixed assets (In
some of the surveyed enterprises, transformations in pro-
duction processes adversely affected capacity utilization.
Usually, the production of unprofitable assortments was
cancelled, closing down entire production lines, while fixed
assets remained, as their sale was not easy).
Transformations in production processes often result
from the more effective utilization of working time in firms
characterized by attractive wages coupled with new work
discipline standards. This refers, in particular, to enterpris-
es privatized with a majority stake held by foreign owners,
in which foreign strategic investors introduced new orga-
nization and different patterns of employee attitudes. As a
result of industrial restructuring, production capacity
increased in 10 enterprises, remained unchanged in seven
firms, and fell in three; three enterprises failed to provide
explicit information (for example, seasonal fluctuations of
production and difficulties with specifying the level of
capacity utilization were stressed, the scale of plant mod-
ernization was too large to compare 1990 with 1996). 
Privatized firms, both those with a majority stake held
by foreign owners and those with a majority stake held by
Polish owners, associate changes in production process
with ownership transformations. The problem lies not only
in the fact of production modernization, launching new
products, the acquisition of know-how, but also in genuine
interest of employees in  labor productivity growth (the dis-
tribution of company shares among employees contributed
to improvement of the quality of work according to one
respondent).
Changes in cost structure and cost management
policy
We asked respondents about changes in cost structure;
that is, changes in the share of various items in total costs.
One firm (a foreign one) provided no information at all on
this subject. There were six firms whose cost structures
were fairly stable in all categories (that is, for which all
changes in the shares of various items were less than 10
percentage points). These included three employee-owned
firms, a firm owned by a Polish investor, and two publicly
traded clothing firms. 
The most frequently cited change in the cost structure
was a rise in the share of materials and/or energy costs
(noted in 16 firms). Eleven firms from all ownership cate-
gories except NIF noted a rise in materials and energy costs.
Three firms noted a rise in materials costs alone, and two
firms noted a rise in energy but not in materials costs. By
way of contrast, four firms (three of which were NIF or
state treasury companies) noted a fall in the share of mate-
rials and/or energy costs. There did not seem to be any pat-
terns with respect to industrial branch.
The firms in our sample seemed to have greater success
in controlling  labor costs, since of the thirteen firms men-
tioning a change in their share, six reported a drop. Here,
too, we fail to observe a pattern with respect to type of
ownership. Privatized firms with dispersed shareholding 
that is, employee-owned and publicly-traded companies 
seem to exhibit a relatively high degree of stability in their
cost structures. Privatized firms with strategic investors
seem to have experienced greater increases in materials
and energy costs than state treasury and NIF companies.
Generally, firms appeared to be more successful at limiting
the share of  labor costs than the share of materials and
energy. This may be due to the greater ease of simply
reducing the overmanning typically inherited from the
socialist era as opposed to altering the production process
to make it more efficient, but also to increased quality of
inputs in the production process  especially through use of
Western imports. Having asked respondents about changes
in the structure of costs and the reasons behind those
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changes, we asked them what sort of cost management pol-
icy had been implemented. Seven firms provided no infor-
mation on this subject. One firm admitted openly to having
no cost policy, and the answers of two others indicated indi-
rectly that they had no policy.
We have divided cost management policies into three
categories: attempts to limit costs by using inputs more
sparingly; investments in technology which would reduce
costs, and a strategy which was intimately linked to funda-
mental organizational change. The first type of policy  sav-
ing by making various kinds of cuts  was found in six firms
from various branches, none of which had a strategic
investor. The second cost management strategy, based on
investment, was applied in four firms (two with strategic
investors  one foreign and one Polish). The final type of
cost management strategy, based on fundamental organiza-
tional change, was demonstrated by four firms, three of
them foreign-owned. In general, NIF firms seem particular-
ly weak on cost strategy (two had none) and foreign-owned
firms seem to be strongest. With the exception of one
employee-owned company which has introduced cost and
profit centers, privatized firms with highly dispersed share-
holding have tended to focus their cost management strate-
gies on savings in the use of inputs, rather than on deeper
changes such as investment in new technology or funda-
mental organizational change.
Changes in the composition of suppliers
The composition of suppliers changed in 17 surveyed
enterprises, while in three it remained unchanged (three
firms did not provide data). In most enterprises, the prob-
lem lies not only in the change of the composition of suppli-
ers, but also in forging new relationships between suppliers
and receivers. Changes in the structure of suppliers are
often caused by transformation in the sector of suppliers
themselves, for example changes resulting from privatiza-
tion and restructuring, closing of many firms, inability to
catch up with quality requirements, obsolete structure of
production by suppliers, and so on. Such changes also result
from changes in wholesale trade and in turnover in some
goods. The liquidation of many intermediary levels, espe-
cially in foreign trade, required from many firms to create
new links with suppliers, to look for new, better sources of
raw and base materials, as well as components.
In many surveyed enterprises, especially foreign-owned
firms which made sizeable investment in modernization of
production and quality improvements, the share of import-
ed materials and components has increased. This was often
due to the fact that growing market competition required
from many enterprises, especially in the food and clothing
sectors, a major boost of their products quality, which in
turn necessitated finding suppliers of better quality raw
materials. For many enterprises, know-how transfer or pur-
chase of modern technologies from foreign firms meant
establishment of advantageous relationships or even capital
links. This referred to privatized firms with a majority stake
held by foreign owners, and also to engineering industry
firms covered by our survey, which changed their product
strategy and became specialized in the execution of orders
placed by particular customers. However, technology trans-
fer seems to occur quite frequently as a result of normal
licensing arrangements, without ownership ties.
In the analyzed food-processing and engineering indus-
tries sectors, the bargaining power of suppliers declined
substantially. This fact is associated by the surveyed enter-
prises with privatization of the economy and its opening to
foreign competition. The manufacturing and financial poten-
tial of producers of both capital and consumer goods
increased so markedly that in the present situation they may
impose their conditions on suppliers, and the accessibility of
foreign markets adds to their bargaining power. 
4.2. Investment Processes
The investment decisions of surveyed enterprises reflect
well the overall economic climate and the assessment of
future demand. The completion of investment projects in a
given year reflects the expectations and financial opportuni-
ties two or three years back. The necessity to invest
depends mostly on the competitiveness of markets on
which the enterprise operates, and on the toughness of the
financial system in the economy. Our research has also tack-
led investment processes in enterprises, in particular the
structure of expenditures on development in real and finan-
cial terms in 199096 and investment objectives.
Structure of expenditures on development in real
and financial terms in 199096
In all the surveyed enterprises, the level of investment
outlays has been increasing. In most firms these outlays
account for 2040 per cent of revenues. In some enterpris-
es, investment outlays account for 57 per cent of total rev-
enues, and in only one case the expenditures were insignifi-
cant and involved purchases of computer equipment, tools
and protective clothing (a NIF company). Enterprises pur-
chase production lines, machinery and technology and set
up R&D departments to introduce new products or to mod-
ernize the already produced ones. Many enterprises spend
considerable amounts of their financial assets on develop-
ment of their distribution networks, purchases of transport
equipment, new forms of marketing, promotion and prod-
uct advertising.
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Sizeable outlays of privatized firms in the clothing and
engineering industries have been spent on improving the
quality of production, as well as on research and develop-
ment. These outlays were the highest in firms imple-
menting ISO 9000 standards. Large outlays are also spent
on buildings. Such investments usually involve moderniza-
tion and adjustment of old factories. There are also new
projects being carried out in this field, including construc-
tion of new warehouses, new production departments
and complete plants. Such investments are mostly under-
taken by foreign strategic investors in the food-processing
industry. The investment in equity or stakes of other firms
is insignificant. In only two surveyed enterprises are such
endeavors aimed at the establishment of new relation-
ships with suppliers of raw materials and sub-compo-
nents. There is still very little room for joint undertakings
of enterprises competing against each other, such as joint
development of a product, creation of a common distrib-
ution network, development of new technologies or
entering new markets. 
Investment objectives and sources of investment
financing
Investment objectives of surveyed enterprises are very
convergent and not differentiated by either the ownership
form or branch association. The analysis shows that the
major objectives of investment projects undertaken by
enterprises were improvement of the enterprises market
position, improvement of product quality and creating a new
image of the enterprise and product. These objectives are
equally important for both privatized firms and state treasury
companies. The improvement of the market position is the
key issue for most surveyed enterprises, due to increased
competitiveness in the sectors in which they conduct their
activities. Cash flow on current activities, issuing of shares,
and commerciality are of key significance for investment
financing. In all privatized firms with a majority stake held by
foreign owners, funds provided by the strategic investor
account for a sizeable share of investment outlays.
4.3. Market Adjustments
Before starting the analyses of the market adjustment,
the investigated companies should be divided into two
groups. As both the markets have different profiles, a clear
division into the companies operating on the investment
goods markets (firms from the machine industry) and on the
consumer goods markets (companies from the clothing and
food sector) is necessary to appropriately estimate the
intensity of the market adjustments in the investigated com-
panies. The contrasting profile of the markets results from
the different characteristics of the offered products and the
final consumers, as well as the different structure of com-
petition on the two markets. These two markets are also
characterized by different key factors determining strong
market position of the companies in the long run  so-called
key success factors (KSF). In addition, it should be noted
that in referring to types of ownership in this chapter, firms
have been divided into three categories: state-owned com-
panies (NIF and state treasury companies), foreign-owned
companies and companies privatized by Polish capital.
The respondents from the companies from the machine
industry, asked to list the KSF, most frequently listed
advanced technologies (seven answers among nine respon-
dents). Next in importance, the respondents listed the qual-
ity of offered products (five answers) and production costs
(four answers). Only two respondents mentioned the
importance of the marketing and the well-developed distri-
bution network.
The respondents from the food and clothing industry
gave opposite responses. All respondents enumerated mar-
keting (understood as promotion activity  sales and prod-
uct and trademark promotion) as one of the KSF. In the sec-
ond place, they listed distribution network and quality of the
offered goods (six answers among nine respondents). Only
two respondents included advanced technology as the KSF
in this sector. Taking into account the above observations it
should be said that the companies from the food and cloth-
ing industry make the strong market position dependent
mainly on the market adjustments. According to the
respondents, in the companies from the machine industry,
the product adjustments play a much more important role
than market adaptations. Thus, we observed a larger inten-
sity of market adjustments in the companies from the food
and clothing industry than in the investment goods group.
Turnover and sales trends
If we analyze the output in 1990s in the investigated
companies in comparison with 1980s, it appears that in the
most cases the production volume has decreased or
remained on the same level since 1980s. 
Companies from the machine industry experienced a
more significant decrease of turnover than the companies
from the food and clothing industries. There is only one
company from the machine industry which has increased its
production capacity since the 1980s. In four companies out
of the nine which gave us data about the turnover in the
1980s and 1990s, manufacturing has remained on the same
level. Among these companies there are two companies
privatized by foreign capital, one company privatized by
domestic capital and one state-owned company. The
remaining four companies (three state-owned companies
and one privatized by domestic capital) have decreased pro-
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duction in comparison with the 1980s. It is worth mention-
ing that the state-owned companies have decreased their
output by 5070 per cent while the company privatized by
domestic capital has decreased production only by 1215
per cent.
In the case of the companies from the food and clothing
industries, we can clearly separate the group of the compa-
nies which increased their output in the 1990s in comparison
with the 1980s. There are six companies in this group  four
companies privatized by foreign investors and one privatized
by domestic capital and one state-owned company. It should
be said that this group contains the whole population of the
companies privatized by foreign capital in these industries. It
also observed the largest increase of output in this group in
relation with the two other firms. The remaining seven com-
panies (four privatized by domestic capital and three state-
owned) have decreased the production since 1980s. 
In the 1980s export was very important for the compa-
nies from the machine industry. Among ten companies
which gave us data about sales directions in 1980s, half of
them placed over 40 per cent of their output on the foreign
markets. The percentage share of export in relation with
the total production, in some cases exceeded even 75 per
cent. It is worth mentioning that the companies from the
machine industry exported mainly to the former CMEA
countries. Export to the Western countries was marginal.
Among the investigated population, in the 1980s only three
companies placed more than 90 per cent of their output on
the domestic market. It should also be underlined that
among five companies which exported over 40 per cent of
their output in the 1980s, three companies have not been
privatized yet.
The companies from the machine industry were forced
to look for new customers after the collapse of the markets
of former CMEA countries. It resulted in increasing interest
in the domestic market as well as the export reorientation
to the Western markets. Therefore in the case of the com-
panies from the machine industry in the 1990s export does
not play such a significant role as it played in the 1980s. At
present there are only two companies, from the investigat-
ed population, exporting more than 40 per cent of the total
output  one state-owned company and one firm privatized
by foreign capital. At the same time five companies place
their production mainly on the domestic market  two pri-
vatized by domestic capital, and two state-owned, and one
privatized by foreign investor. In contrast to the 1980s com-
panies from machine industry export their products mainly
to the Western markets. There are only two cases  a com-
pany privatized by domestic capital and a company priva-
tized by foreign capital  where export to the former CMEA
countries exceeds export to the Western countries. Addi-
tionally, there is only one company where export to the
Eastern markets amounts to 20 per cent of its total output
(at the same time exports of that company to the Western
countries exceeds 45 per cent of its total production). How-
ever, according to the respondents, the eastern markets
have increased their attractiveness for approximately two
years. It is connected with the gradual increase of demand
on these markets for investment goods, and larger prof-
itability of these markets as well as the larger credibility of
the Eastern contracting parties. It is worth mentioning that
the companies privatized by domestic as well as foreign cap-
ital express the largest interest in the Eastern markets.
In the case of the companies from the food and clothing
industry the situation seems to be different. The companies
from the food and clothing industry in the 1980s were more
dependent on the domestic market than the companies
from the machine industry. Among the eleven companies
which gave the data about the sales directions in the 1980s,
five operated mainly on the domestic market (two compa-
nies did not export at all). There were only three companies
exporting over 40 per cent of their total production. It is
worth mentioning that all these three companies manufac-
ture clothing products as subcontractors of Western com-
panies. The export in the third group of companies, export-
ing from 10 to 40 per cent of their total output, usually did
not exceed 1520 per cent of the total production. The
most important difference of sale directions between com-
panies from the food and clothing industries and the
machine industry resulted from the export orientation.
Companies from the food and clothing industries in contrast
to the companies from the machine industry were not so
dependent on the markets of the former CMEA countries.
These companies exported their products mainly to the
Western countries. It was a positive heritage of the 1980s
for companies from the food and clothing industries in com-
parison to the machine companies. In the case of companies
producing investment goods, large dependence on the east-
ern markets in the 1980s was the main obstacle to adapting
to the new economic environment at the beginning of the
1990s. According to the respondents, the export activity of
the companies from the food and clothing industries in the
1980s, operating mainly on the western markets helped
them, after economic transformation, to adjust their activi-
ty to the requirements of the market economy.
In the 1990s, in the case of the companies from the food
and clothing industries we cannot observe such rapid shift of
sales directions as in the case of companies from machine
industry. This results from the much smaller earlier depen-
dence on the eastern markets. At present, there are four
companies exporting over 40 per cent of their output.
Among them there are three above-mentioned clothing
companies and one food company. In the case of two cloth-
ing companies the percentage of exports in relation to the
total output has even increased since the 1980s. These
three clothing companies still export mainly to the western
markets as in the 1980s. The food company included in this
group, which exported little to the west in the 1980s and
nothing to the east, now exports 60 per cent of its produc-
tion to the eastern markets. In the 1990s the companies
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from the food and clothing industries are also more inter-
ested in the domestic market than in the 1980s. Six compa-
nies among 13 companies sell over 90 per cent of their out-
put on the domestic market. This focus on the domestic
market is shared by foreign-owned firms. The attraction of
the Polish market results from its size, its present and
potential high rate of growth, and its high profitability. Addi-
tionally these companies were privatized mainly by interna-
tional companies, which are not interested in exporting to
the markets where they already operate. In the case of the
food and clothing industries we can observe the gradual
domination of companies privatized by foreign investors on
the Polish market (especially in the case of food companies).
As these companies start to squeeze out the state-owned
companies and companies privatized by domestic capital
from the domestic market, the latter are forced to place
their products abroad or to strengthen their position on the
local markets. Among the remaining nine companies, six
firms started placing their surplus output on the eastern
markets in the 1990s. According to the respondents, export
to the eastern markets is a large opportunity for them
because it is much easier to place the products there than
on the more competitive domestic and foreign markets. 
In contrast to the companies privatized by foreign
investors, state-owned and domestically-owned private
companies (with some exceptions, especially clothing com-
panies) operate rather as local producers. Only two com-
panies from the food industry from the remaining two
groups could be consider as producers operating on the
national market  one state-owned company producing
vegetable oil and one company privatized by domestic cap-
ital producing food concentrates. The rest of the companies
operate as local producers.
Profitability
The increased attractiveness of the Eastern markets in
the last two years for companies from the machine industry
mainly results from the increased profitability of these mar-
kets in comparison with the early 1990s. In the 1980s the
markets of the former CMEA countries were more prof-
itable than the domestic market. According to the respon-
dents, in the 1980s Western markets were the most prof-
itable but at that time the companies from the machine
industry practically did not operate on them. In the early
1990s the Eastern markets become less profitable. For
many companies from the machine industry export to the
markets of the former CMEA countries was very often
unprofitable, and many of them were forced to give up
these markets. Companies had to turn their attention to the
domestic, more profitable market. The strongest and the
best companies from this sector started to export to the
Western, most profitable markets. In the 1980s for the
companies from the food and clothing industry, in contrast
to the machine industry, the CMEA markets were the least
profitable. At that time the domestic and western markets
were much more profitable. However, respondents said
that in the 1990s the domestic market was the most prof-
itable; the western market became less profitable mainly
because of the increase of production and  labor costs in
comparison with the 1980s. 
Distribution
The types of distribution in the two investigated groups
 companies from the machine industry and the food and
clothing industries  are different. This results from two fac-
tors. First, the products in both sectors are aimed at differ-
ent kind of final customers. The companies from the
machine industry usually meet the needs of identified final
individual customers. The companies from the food and
clothing industries meet the demand of anonymous mass
clients. Secondly, the different profiles of products require a
different approach to the distribution process (in the case of
the companies from the machine industry distribution of the
products is connected with their assembly).
In the case of the companies from the machine industry
direct sale is the most popular way of distribution. Only in
two cases was the distribution system designed differently.
In addition, the distribution systems in the companies priva-
tized by domestic as well as by foreign capital should be
characterized as uniform systems. Mixed systems are noted
only in the case of state-owned companies. This is due to
the fact that the collapse of demand after 1990 (mainly
because of the breakdown of the eastern markets) more
strongly affected the companies which still remain in the
state hands. These companies were forced to develop sec-
ondary product lines in order to survive on the market.
However, selling on new markets very often requires the
establishment of the new distribution network. Without
financial support and the knowledge of market conditions,
these companies were forced to pass the distribution
process to the wholesalers. This process was observed with
different intensity among the three companies having mixed
distribution systems.
If we analyze the intensity of the distribution adjust-
ments in the investigated companies from the machine
industry, we can affirm that the most advanced adjustments
are observed in the companies privatized by the foreign
investors. They are more aggressive in the area of direct
contacts with the final customers. The companies privatized
by foreign strategic investors also spend more funds and pay
more attention to the organization of distribution networks
and professional training on the field of product sale, and
contacts with customers.
If we consider the distribution adjustments in the
remaining two groups of investigated companies, we can
affirm that the adjustments in the state-owned companies
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are more advanced than the adjustments in the companies
privatized by domestic capital. This is due to the fact that
the state-owned companies have had to look for new
markets to place their output more aggressively than
companies privatized by domestic capital. In contrast to
the state-owned companies, companies privatized by
domestic capital, especially companies privatized by
MEBO, usually had a good economic and financial standing
in the early 1990s. These companies were not so depen-
dent on the eastern markets in the 1980s and at present
usually keep the share of the domestic market that they
had in the 1980s. Consequently distribution adjustments
have a very limited scope. 
The distribution adjustments in the companies from the
food and clothing industries are much more intensive than in
the case of companies from the machine industry. This
results from the fact that a well-developed and well-orga-
nized distribution system is one of the most important fac-
tors determining the companys competitive position on the
market (KSF). The intensive distribution adjustments play a
much more important role in the food and clothing indus-
tries than in the machine industry.
As in the case of the group of companies from the
machine industry, the most advanced distribution adjust-
ments can be observed among the companies privatized by
foreign strategic investors. These companies base their dis-
tribution systems mainly on the distribution channels of their
owners. We also observed that these companies separated
the distribution process from the organizational structure,
usually by creating trade companies responsible for distrib-
ution. This allows for decentralizing the distribution process
as well as increasing its efficiency.
The distribution adjustments in the case of the compa-
nies privatized by domestic capital are less advanced than in
the companies privatized by foreign investors. They distrib-
ute their products mainly through the wholesalers. At the
same time they are developing their own distribution chan-
nels. The least advanced distribution adjustments are
observed in the state-owned companies. The distribution
process in these companies is based mainly on direct sale to
the wholesalers. At the same time, the state-owned compa-
nies are developing their own distribution networks to a
smaller extent than the companies privatized by domestic
capital.
Sales promotion and price policy
Before starting the analysis of the intensity of the sales
promotion in the investigated companies once again the dif-
ferent profile of the two sectors should be pointed out. Pro-
motion adjustments  like distribution adjustments  play a
much more important role, according to the respondents, in
the case of the companies from food and clothing industry.
The promotion activity of the companies from the
machine industry is mainly aimed at public relations activi-
ty (PR) and direct contact (direct sales) with the final
clients. Among the most frequent PR activities are special-
ist seminars and publications in trade magazines. Among
the most frequent tools of direct sales are participation in
trade fairs and organization of shows and travelling dis-
plays. In the companies from the food and clothing indus-
tries the situation is different. These companies mainly
focus on advertisement activity (press, TV, radio, bill-
boards, caisson) and promotion activity (competitions,
tasting). PR activity and direct sales were observed only in
the companies where the sale promotion adjustments are
the most advanced. 
The most advanced sales promotion adjustments
among the companies from the food and clothing industry
can be observed as in the companies privatized by foreign
capital. These companies spend the largest funds on sales
promotion. They also engage in much more PR and direct
sales activity than the state-owned companies and compa-
nies privatized by domestic capital. Analyzing the sale pro-
motion adjustments we can divide the examined compa-
nies from food and clothing industry into two groups. We
observe a clear division, taking into account the intensity of
sales promotion adjustments, between the group of com-
panies privatized by foreign investors and the group includ-
ing state-owned companies and companies privatized by
domestic capital. Here, the gap between domestically-
owned private companies and state-owned companies is
much smaller than that between foreign-owned compa-
nies and all the others. In the machine industry we
observed a similar division between privatized companies
and state-owned companies. However, here the gap
between foreign-owned companies (again the best per-
formers) and domestically-owned companies is much
smaller than between foreign-owned companies and state-
owned companies.
With respect to the formulation of the price policy in
the examined companies, we observed a clear division
between privatized companies and state-owned compa-
nies. This tendency is very clear in the companies from the
machine industry as well as in those from the food and
clothing industries. The privatized companies formulate
the price policy adopting the market price as the base
price. We noticed such behavior among almost the whole
population of privatized companies. There is only one
exception  the company privatized by MEBO from the
machine industry, having an almost monopolistic position
on its market. The state-owned companies are much less
advanced in the field of price policy adjustments. Among
eight such companies which gave us data about the formu-
lation of the price policy, five companies formulate the
price policy adopting as the base price the production cost
of the offered products.
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While analyzing financial matters one should bear in
mind the problems enterprises encountered in the trans-
formation period. In the early years of this period, the
recession obviously contributed to the fall in profitability
and to the deterioration of financial liquidity in the enter-
prise sector. Systemic solutions, such as tax regulations,
exchange rates and customs tariffs also had their impact
on the financial standing of enterprises. Moreover, inten-
sive restructuring may lead to a temporary deterioration
of financial results, which should be taken into account
while analyzing efficiency ratios and financial liquidity. With
this in mind, we analyze the impact of ownership status
and branch association of firms on their finance, concen-
trating on their initial position, sources of financing, finan-
cial standing, indebtedness and problems in the field of
financial management. 
5.1. The Outset of Transformation
The situation at the starting point of the transformation
was quite important. The analyses indicate differentiated
initial positions at the beginning of transformation. Most
enterprises were free of the troublesome legacy of the
past affecting their operation and financial standing. Howev-
er, in nine enterprises adverse circumstances affected their
situation later on.
The burden of the former systems legacy was experi-
enced, first of all, by three groups of enterprises: all enter-
prises covered by the NIF program (irrespective of branch)
and privatized manufacturers of capital goods. The most dif-
ficult situation was found in the NIF companies and foreign-
owned electro-engineering companies. The former groups
problems were due to the long-year delay in the field of
ownership, economic and organization transformations,
during which time they retained their status as companies
owned by the state treasury. The two foreign-owned com-
panies reported the heaviest burden of the legacy of the
past and the most difficult situation at the starting point.
One was a telecommunication components manufacturer
producing obsolete, non-competitive products. The other
had been hit by arrears in customer payments and the loss
of the eastern market, which accounted for 60 per cent of
sales. Less serious troubles were faced by two engineering
industry enterprises privatized with the participation of Pol-
ish investors. 
The analysis of the starting point position of the sur-
veyed firms allows two groups of problems to be distin-
guished depending on their sources: external and internal,
depending on the enterprise. The first group includes the
loss of markets (the eastern market and some segments of
the domestic market, for example, the falling demand of the
mining industry). The problems caused by strategic errors
made at the beginning of the transformation period include
lack of industrial-commercial and organizational adjust-
ments, wrong investment policy and inefficiency in settling
inter-company debts. The troublesome legacy of the past
resulted in the deterioration of the financial position. Negli-
gence in the field of adjustment strategies, mounting bal-
ance-sheet losses and indebtedness resulted in the necessi-
ty of raising restructuring funds. On the other hand, thanks
to export adjustments embarked on earlier, some firms in
the analyzed sample reported good economic and financial
standing. This group included clothing industry enterprises
and major exporters to the European Union countries, as
well as firms operating on particularly attractive markets (in
the brewery or candy branches). Strengthening positive
trends in the financial indicators of these enterprises was a
priority target of their privatization. 
Summing up, many enterprises entered the period of
transformation with a legacy adversely affecting their finan-
cial position. In some firms these factors were external, in
others they were enterprise-dependent (for example, neg-
ligence in the field of adjustment strategies). The financial
position of NIF companies and manufacturers of final goods
in the group with foreign investors gave rise to particular
concern. Hence, their new owners have been faced with
considerable challenges as regards restructuring and devel-
opment of these firms.
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5.2. Financing of Activity
Despite different approaches to the role of borrowing, it
should be stated that credits were not the major source of
investment financing, while current activity was supported
with credits, especially when it was required by the features
of activity (for example, seasonal fluctuations of production).
The analysis of the entire group of enterprises points to
striving at self-reliance given the high interest rate on cred-
its. This tendency was particularly strong in privatized enter-
prises with good economic and financial standing, although
it was present in the entire group of surveyed enterprises.
However, it can be seen from the analysis of surveys that
changes have occurred in the field of supporting investment
programs with bank credits. 
Another source of financing is the liquidation of over-
expanded organization and assets, for example, through
sales or lease of fixed assets, and/or changes in the profile of
activities. This phenomenon was recorded in eight enter-
prises, both state-owned and privatized. Financial opera-
tions were also of significance in some companies. They
were conducted in half of the monitored enterprises, but
only in six were they a major source of financing. Privatized
enterprises invested their cash flow in stakes in other firms,
usually enterprises operating in the same branch and/or
companies dealing with marketing and distribution of these
firms products, as well as in the shares of publicly traded
companies, other securities, and time deposits. 
Activity financing by borrowing
Credit was not a popular source of activity financing in
our enterprises. State treasury and NIF companies reported
the largest needs in the field of borrowing funds for their
activity. Despite their already mentioned reluctance to bor-
row from banks, all these groups of firms benefited from
both working-capital and investment credits. Four state
treasury companies avoided credits for investment activity,
but lack of external financing turned out to be a barrier to
development. For several years enterprises covered by the
NIF program were deprived of restructuring capital due to
postponements of the program implementation. Conse-
quently, these enterprises faced a particularly hard financial
barrier to development. On the one hand, boards were
forced to take credits and, on the other hand, they were
afraid of being dependent on banks, and of problems with
repayments. Consequently, only indispensable working-cap-
ital credits were drawn, together with loans for solving
financial problems. Privatized enterprises usually experi-
enced neither the need for borrowing funds for their activi-
ty, nor the financial barrier to development, thanks to their
equity capital. This referred, first of all, to firms privatized
with the participation of foreign investors. The financial
potential of investors allowed firms threatened with bank-
ruptcy to survive, and speeded up the development of
enterprises enjoying good financial standing. Borrowing was
limited here to small working-capital credits, while invest-
ment credits were taken only occasionally. Despite its lack
of popularity, in most monitored enterprises the accessibili-
ty of bank credit was evaluated positively (they could get
loans if they wanted them).
Summing up, the surveyed enterprises were cautious
about resorting to credits. State-owned firms were forced to
take investment credits as they run into the financial barrier of
development. Private companies relying on their equity usu-
ally did not take investment credit, but supported their cur-
rent operation with working-capital credits. Despite the
improvement of relations with banks following privatization,
bank credit remained a secondary source of activity financing. 
Sale and lease of assets
The restructuring of organization and assets resulted in
the intensification of getting rid of assets through sale or
lease. This was most important for the manufacturers of
capital goods, relatively badly hit by the recession of the
early years of the transformation. In state treasury compa-
nies the sale and lease of assets were a major source of rev-
enues. Firms from this group were characterized by the
extent of their over-expanded assets. Restructuring of a
defensive, austere nature was accompanied by processes
from the sales of assets. Among companies in this group,
only one neither sold nor leased its assets. In one firm
owned by an NIF , sale (and to a smaller extent also lease) of
assets was also a major source of revenue (above 10 per
cent of the value of sales). In the case of companies from the
foreign privatization group, the sale and lease of assets
meant paving the way for expansive strategies. In general,
unlike some state treasury and NIF companies, privatized
enterprises treated revenue from the sale of assets as a
short-term consequence of regular defensive activities
(paving the way for strategic transformations). In the for-
mer groups of firms, where radical changes had not taken
place, the gradual selling out of parts of assets aging both
economically and materially was seen as an additional
source of financing the activity throughout a period longer
than in private companies, where the funds contributed by
investors allow them to speed up the restructuring. 
Financial operations
Financial operations were not a significant field of activi-
ty for the monitored firms. Less than half of the analyzed
companies were involved in major financial operations, and
in only some of them were these operations regarded as a
significant source of activity financing. In the group of state
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treasury companies and NIF only one enterprise (a state
treasury company) conducted financial operations on a sig-
nificant scale. More intensive activity in this field was con-
ducted by some privatized enterprises. Examples include:
equity investments by a brewing company, a well-known
listed company operating in the textile branch, and an engi-
neering industry company, and investment in time deposits
and securities by the candy enterprise from the foreign pri-
vatization group.
5.3. Financial Standing
Ability to generate profits
The analysis of gross profitability reveals an interesting
and differentiated picture. The indicators for the first half of
1996 are not surprising. Privatized enterprises have better
abilities to generate profits than state treasury companies
and enterprises covered by the NIF program. A look at
firms from the state group (state treasury and NIF compa-
nies) shows similar (low) levels of profitability. On the other
hand, the generally higher profitability of private companies
is differentiated, as firms from the Polish privatization group
record the highest profitability in the entire population,
exceeding as much as three times the average indicator for
the foreign privatization group. In 199596, the latter was
the lowest in the entire sample, but has been recording a
very fast growth rate since 1993.
State treasury companies are characterized by a high
and increasing growth rate in 199294. The analysis of these
companies reveals opportunities in the field of restructuring
rooted in defensive adjustment strategies. State treasury
companies reorganized their structures by getting rid of
over-expanded assets, controlled their costs by introducing
internal cost accounting and eliminated market inertia by
developing marketing structures. Industrial adjustments and
modernization of the productive potential were also of rel-
evance in this context. The restructuring of state-owned
enterprises stabilized at a fairly high level. This was the peri-
od of consuming the austerity effects of (largely) defensive
strategies. In 1996, gross profitability declined almost three-
fold. State-owned enterprises deprived of external financing
faced the consequences of capital barriers. A diminishing
ability to generate profits is the result of a shortage of
restructuring capital, as well as the exhaustion of positive
effects of utilization of the existing potential. 
The situation of NIF companies was different. The post-
ponement of the programs implementation resulted in the
halting of restructuring undertakings for several years.
Gross profitability, low in 1992, declined below zero a year
later. The implementation of the NIF program at the end of
1995 did not bring any improvement of efficiency ratios.
Gross profitability dropped by 1.5 percentage points in
1995 and another 2 percentage points in the first half of
1996, when it reached the level of 5.3 per cent. If NIF and
state treasury companies are taken as one group, which is
justified given their long-time operation as state-owned
enterprises, we shall see a gradual increase in the ability to
generate profits until 1994, when gross profitability peaked,
followed by a decline through the end of 1996 caused by
lack of external financing. 
Firms from the Polish privatization group showed, as a
rule, favorable and stable profitability indicators. Interest-
ing conclusions can be drawn from the comparison of the
indicator for this group between 1994 and June 1996 and
that for state treasury companies. In privatized firms prof-
itability declined only insignificantly, while in state-owned
enterprises it plummeted as much as threefold. Moreover,
in the case of the Polish privatization group the decline in
the average profitability ratio is caused by the diminishing
ability to generate profit in only one firm (in 1995 it
recorded a balance-sheet loss). There are several reasons
for the high profitability of the analyzed firms in this group.
Six of these firms are publicly traded companies, whose
finances were solid at the time of their initial public offer-
ings. Following their privatization, these firms enjoyed
financing (issues of shares, contributions made by foreign
partners) as well as promotion effects connected with
their status as public companies. Generally, firms from this
group recorded the highest and at the same time the most
stable gross profitability in the whole sample (However,
these enterprises also had the best starting point).
A more differentiated situation was found in the group
of enterprises privatized with the participation of foreign
investors. On average, they recorded the lowest prof-
itability in the first half of 1996, and by far the fastest
growth rate in the whole analyzed sample (the increase in
the average value of the indicator for the group was
almost 20 percentage points). However, the foreign pri-
vatization group was not homogeneous. Two firms found
themselves on the verge of bankruptcy in 1993. In both
cases, profitability dropped to disastrous levels (-68.8 per
cent and -79.4 per cent, respectively). Restructuring capi-
tal contributed by the foreign investor allowed them to
recover from the deep collapse. 
The remaining firms from this group were characterized
by their stable ability to generate profits; however, apart
from the above-mentioned convalescing firms and one
candy enterprise, their profitability declined in the first half
of 1996 compared to the same period of 1995. Foreign
investors interested in high rates of return in the long run
were pursuing their development strategies, which incurred
high costs. This phenomenon also occurred in the Polish
privatization group, but on a smaller scale. 
The analysis of net profitability confirms the above
conclusions and findings concerning gross profitability.
Better performance of foreign privatization than in the
case of the gross indicator results from tax incentives for
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firms privatized with the participation of foreign investors.
In addition, the value of profitability ratios in the analyzed
sample was dependent on branch affiliation of a given firm.
Three manufacturers of capital goods recorded negative
profitability. The improved ability to generate profits by
privatized enterprises is also indicated by the return on
their assets. In most firms analyzed, the return on assets
declined in 1994 compared to the previous year. That year
of favorable business trends encouraged optimistic fore-
casts, which were another incentive for modernization and
expansion of the productive potential. The improvement
of enterprises financial results allowed for increased pur-
chases of capital goods. With the growth rate of produc-
tive assets outpacing that of profits, the rates of return on
assets were declining in that period. 
The sharpest drop was recorded in the foreign privati-
zation group where, despite an improvement, the return
on assets was negative as recently as in 1994. External con-
tributions made by investors were the main source of
financing of the growing assets. After 1994, the return on
assets in the group of foreign privatization had been grow-
ing steadily by the end of the period covered by our analy-
sis. In the Polish privatization group, a drop in the return
on sales caused by growing investment expenditures
occurred in 1995. However, the average value of the indi-
cator for all privatized firms has been growing (thanks to
its fast increase in the foreign group). The indicators for
NIF and state treasury companies were stable in the whole
period of 199295. At the end of the analyzed period, the
tendencies in the field of return on assets became diver-
gent, as the ability to generate profit is quickly declining in
state treasury companies, while improving in firms cov-
ered by the NIF program. 
In privatized firms, the return on assets for the entire
group had been growing since 1994 and for both sub-groups
since 1995, which might be an indication of this favorable
trend becoming permanent. Another factor of this indica-
tors growth was the already mentioned sale of assets,
decreasing the value of the denominator of the return on
assets ratio (particularly in the case of firms from the foreign
group). Considerable sales of assets were also recorded in
state treasury companies, although they did not affect signif-
icantly the value of the return on assets, due to the stronger
downward tendency of profitability. 
The analysis of return on equity confirms the higher
ability to generate profits by private companies. In this
regard, enterprises from the Polish privatization group
turned out to be the most stable ones, as they managed to
maintain high profitability and a high return on equity
throughout the whole analyzed period. Favorable ratios
recorded by state treasury companies deteriorated after
1995, while those of NIF companies became more favor-
able in 1996, which might be an indication of early symp-
toms of transformation. The most substantial improve-
ment of efficiency ratios was shown by firms from the for-
eign privatization group due to financing from external
sources and strategic adjustments made by investors. It
should also be noted that the value of return on assets and
equity ratios was, as in the case of profitability, branch-
dependent. The most serious difficulties were experienced
here by firms from the electro-engineering branch (in the
foreign privatization group). 
Financial liquidity
In the analyzed group of companies, financial liquidity
indicators were relatively favorable. Taking into account
average values for the entire sample it can be argued that
they were model figures. Differences were found
between various groups of firms and between individual
enterprises. The overall liquidity ratio was more favorable
in privatized firms, being 1.5 times higher than in state
treasury and NIF companies. The former recorded an
increase in the overall liquidity ratio in 1995, when the
value of this ratio was the most favorable in the entire peri-
od. In 1995, the current ratio in the group of state treasury
companies amounted to 2.0 [22]. The decline in 1996 was
to a small extent caused by the rise in short-term liabilities
supporting current operations (in the case of lack of exter-
nal financing). The main reason for the fall in this liquidity
ratio was the decline in stocks of finished products and in
available funds.
If we look at individual enterprises, the picture is less
favorable. In 1995 one engineering industry enterprise had a
liquidity ratio of 4.2. This figure indicates irrational manage-
ment of enterprises assets, leading to a rise in inventories and
in unutilized cash flow. The later decline in the level of the liq-
uidity ratio in the enterprise (to 2.6 in the middle of 1996)
points to an improvement in working assets management. In
the remaining enterprises, in 1995 the value of the analyzed
ratio did not exceed 1.5 and improved in only one case.
The current ratio reached, on average, a higher level in
firms covered by the NIF program. This ratio had been
growing since 1992, reaching its (irrational) maximum level
of 4.0 in 1994. Then it declined to 1.8 in the middle of
1996. This rise in the current ratio must be interpreted as
an unwelcome development, and its later decline indicated
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an improvement in assets management. The improvement
recorded in 1995 was the consequence of better market-
ing techniques and reduced stocks of finished products. In
the middle of 1996, however, the ratio fell, on average,
below its welcome level. One firm still recorded a very
high ratio (although it fell from 5.8 in 1994 to 3.2 in the
middle of 1996), while in another firm this ratio was low
(1.0), as a consequence of short-term liabilities.
Generally, privatized enterprises have the better liquidity
indicators. Companies from the Polish privatization group
showed the highest and most stable average liquidity ratios.
Their level was particularly high in the case of publicly traded
companies operating in the clothing branch, which in order to
cope with competition would accumulate large stocks of fin-
ished products before the start of the season. In the Polish
group, manufacturers of capital goods recorded stable levels
of liquidity. One of them was characterized by excess liquidi-
ty (with the current ratio ranging from 4.2 to 5.2).
The foreign group was characterized by favorable (on
average) financial liquidity. The level of the quick ratio con-
firms the above findings concerning better liquidity of priva-
tized companies. The quick ratio clearly shows some slight
excess liquidity of the Polish group, pointing to imperfec-
tions in managing the assets of enterprises.
5.4. The Structure of the Debt
Enterprises were cautious about borrowing, with short-
term credits clearly dominating. Investment projects were
financed mostly with own funds or contributions made by
foreign investors. Despite the positive evaluation of the
banking system mentioned in sub-section 5.3 and the avail-
ability of credits, enterprises were afraid of long-term
indebtedness (due to high interest costs), and privatized
firms clearly preferred relying on investors contributions
equity. The common application of working-capital credits,
and their substantial share in the structure of liabilities,
resulted from the specific features of branches. 
The analysis of liabilities and receivables points to the
diminishing role of inter-company debts. In all the moni-
tored enterprises inter-company debts had no significant
impact on their financial position in 199596. The most fre-
quently repeated declaration of our respondents, confirmed
by the analysis of their financial records, was that inter-com-
pany debts had been a problem in the early 1990s, but their
significance had since dwindled. 
Another problem here was the collection of overdue
debts. Enterprises resorted to virtually all legal methods of
debt collection. The most popular ones were contracts with
debtors. When all other possibilities are exhausted, debtors
are taken to court. Problems with overdue debts have led
to the establishment of departments and teams in charge of
debt collection. There is no apparent relationship between
the ownership status or branch and the efficiency of solving
this problem, which has lost importance over the course of
the decade. 
5.5. Financial Restructuring
Our analysis of financial restructuring allows us to divide
the firms into three clearly distinct groups. The first of them
is made up of state treasury and NIF companies. Most firms
from this group concluded agreements with creditors, some
with and some without debt-equity swaps. Two enterprises
from this group were not taking any steps towards restruc-
turing of their debts, which they are managing to repay with-
out recourse to agreements with creditors.
In the Polish privatization group, the needs in the field of
financial restructuring were less conspicuous. On the one
hand, this was due to financing by owners, and, on the other
hand, most firms from this group were publicly traded com-
panies with good financial standing both prior to and after
privatization. Among firms from the Polish privatization
group only one was a party to an agreement with debtors. 
In the foreign privatization group, improvement of the
financial situation was secured by financing from external
sources (all enterprises have been re-capitalized) and by
comprehensive organizational, industrial and commercial
restructuring, as well as debt reduction in firms characterized
by poor financial standing.
5.6. Conclusions
In addition to the impact of initial conditions in the
early transformation period on the financial situation of the
entire analyzed group of enterprises, ownership status is
the most important factor differentiating the sample, fol-
lowed by branch affiliation. Our research has confirmed
the most general conclusion outlined in other studies,
namely that the best financial standing or the fastest
growth rate was recorded by privatized enterprises, espe-
cially foreign-owned ones. Equity capital leads to positive
qualitative changes in the operation and structure of
enterprises. The condition and dynamics of financial indi-
cators constitute a composite measure for evaluating
adjustment strategies. Ownership effects are apparent in
the companies           profitability and liquidity measures.
Financial transfers by investors and/or new issues of shares
contributed to a positive change in efficiency ratios of
restructured firms or financial stabilization of viable firms,
especially those which have been operating for a relative-
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ly long time as privatized companies. The indicators for
state treasury companies and firms from the Polish privati-
zation group were similar through 1995, at which point
these tendencies became divergent: privatized firms have
stabilized, while state-owned firms have been hit by a dra-
matic decline caused by the capital shortage barrier. NIF
companies were in decline during several years of privati-
zation limbo, but showed an improvement in 1994  a
period of economic revival.   However, the following years
again brought some              deterioration, though it may
be too early for the effects of the program to crop up in
the form of improved financial results. Firms from the for-
eign privatization group showed a fast growth rate thanks
to financial contributions from  foreign investors, while the
fall in efficiency ratios at the end of the analyzed period
points to an increase in costs of adjustment to growing
competition. Privatized firms also showed better debt-ser-
vicing ability.
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